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INTRODUCTION
The people of Missouri deserve a supreme court that will follow the law.
Instead they are stuck with one seemingly determined to follow prevailing
political whims.1
Early in 2019, the highest Court of Missouri’s northern neighbor Iowa
brought fairness to the operation of that state’s Medicaid framework.2 It did
not do so by, as some are asserting, over-reaching its authority and creating
new law where none existed.3 Instead, it did so by acknowledging relevant
existing law.4 Unfortunately, the Republican-dominated Iowa Legislature
disagreed and quickly ensured that Good v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Services
would have little chance to benefit anyone other than the prevailing litigant.5
The road to the Iowa Court’s decision should not be forgotten—be it in Iowa
or Missouri or any state with relevant comparable law.
The Iowa Court ruled that the Department of Human Services is a
public accommodation for purposes of civil rights law and, as a result, is
constrained by the trans-inclusive language of the Iowa Civil Rights Act
(ICRA).6 In doing so, the court did not truly break new ground, but instead
brought back to life land that had been poisoned by animosity toward trans
existence. For even without explicit trans-inclusive statutory language, a
federal court had long ago invalidated an informal state policy excluding
transition-related healthcare.7 That decision rested heavily on contemporary
consensus of medical professionals regarding the efficacy of such procedures.
After several years of anti-trans scholarship designed to create the appearance
of a lack of consensus,8 the Iowa agency promulgated a formal anti-trans
1

Carrie Severino, Judicial Activism in Missouri, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 1, 2019, 3:24 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/judicial-activism-in-missouri/.
2
Good v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 924 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 2019). The plaintiffs have been
less successful in obtaining attorney’s fees following the victory. Good v. Iowa Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2019 Iowa App. LEXIS 968 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).
3
Todd Blodgett, Taxpayer-Funded Transgender Services Jeopardize Medicaid, DES MOINES
REG. (Mar. 14, 2019, 8:58 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/
columnists/2019/03/14/costly-taxpayer-funded-transgender-services-undermine-medicaid/
3155724002/.
4
Good, 924 N.W.2d at 860–62 (citing Iowa Code §§ 216.7(1)(a) and 216.2(13)(b) (2019)).
5
See 2019 Iowa Acts Ch. 85, §93, 2019 Iowa Acts 45 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE
§ 216.7 (1993)).
6
See 2007 Iowa Acts Ch. 191, 2007 Iowa Acts 625.
7
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
8
Compare Jon K. Meyer & Donna J. Reter, Sex Reassignment: Follow-Up, 36 ARCHIVE
GEN. PSYCH. 1010 (1980); and JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING
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policy,9 which eventually did withstand a federal court challenge.10 In 2007
came the addition of sexual orientation and gender identity to the ICRA, the
latter of which the Good court relied upon.
Lost in the decades of commotion, however, was that Iowa’s 2007
trans-inclusive civil rights protections were preceded by a different act of the
Iowa Legislature which plainly and clearly placed the concept of change of
sex within the auspices of positive Iowa law. That enactment was a
transsexual birth certificate statute.11 It preceded the ICRA expansion
legislation by 31 years. Yet, nowhere in the published decision in 2019’s
Good v. Iowa DHS, the decision Good supplanted (Smith v. Rasmussen12) or
the decision that it supplanted (Pinneke v. Preisser13) can any mention be
found of the legislative imprimatur given to surgical (and even nonsurgical14) transition by Iowa’s 1975–76 Democratic legislative majority and
by Republican Governor Robert Ray.15
The Good court did acknowledge and utilize one aspect of relevant
law in coming to its conclusion. In doing so, it missed the opportunity to
acknowledge the other piece of Iowa’s trans-positive law. This article,
however, is not about Iowa law.
My focus is on how, mere weeks before Good, the Missouri Supreme
Court did not let such an opportunity slip by. In R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV
Sch. Dist. a young trans man had alleged that denial of access to the public
accommodation of male-designated restrooms and locker room facilities was
sex discrimination.16 A five-judge majority found that, at the very least, his
SHE-MALE 178 (1979) (all opposing the legitimacy of surgical sex reassignment);
with Michael Fleming, Carol Steinman, and Gene Bocknek, Methodological Problems in
Assessing Sex-Reassignment Surgery: A Reply to Meyer and Reter, 9 ARCHIVE SEXUAL
BEHAV. 541 (1980); Carol Z. Steinman, Study of Transsexuals Has Just Begun, 19 TV/TS
TAPESTRY, 4 (1980); and, A Great Conspiracy?, TRANSGENDER TAPESTRY, Winter 2002 at
31-32 (all calling into question the objectivity of anti-trans work that was being popularized
in the early 1980s).
9
Good, 2019 Iowa Supp. LEXIS 19 at *21.
10
Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001).
11
1976 Iowa Acts Ch. 1111.
12
See Smith, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001), reversing, Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d
736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
13
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d (8th Cir. 1980).
14
IOWA CODE §144.23(3) (2019) (“by reason of surgery or other treatment”).
15
Oddly enough, it did appear in the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 marriage equality decision–
despite no trans litigants being involved in that case. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893
(Iowa 2009).
16
568 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. 2019).
OF THE
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allegation fit within the sex discrimination expectations of the Missouri
Human Rights Act (MHRA).17 Chief Justice Fischer, in dissent, found
R.M.A.’s legal sex to be irrelevant and that, by holding otherwise, the
majority had “ignored the crux of the petition while discarding the substance
of the MHRA.”18 Justice Wilson and the majority saw Fischer as essentially
suggesting that “R.M.A.’s sex was determined by the genitalia he displayed
at birth and can never be changed.” Significantly, albeit tucked away in a
footnote, Wilson noted that “no lesser authority than the General Assembly
has acknowledged that one’s sex may not remain throughout a person's life
what it was identified to be when that person was born.”19
This article does praise the Missouri court for acknowledging the
clear, trans-positive aspects of the state’s legal framework. However, the
larger purpose of the article is to offer background that would have made the
R.M.A. majority’s footnote seven a bit more robust. It is background that the
Missouri court should employ when it is next faced with questions of how
trans people fit into the concept of discrimination based on “sex” as it exists
in Missouri law. Additionally, it is historical context that courts in other states
that do have a sex discrimination statute and a trans birth certificate statute
but that lack an explicitly trans-inclusive civil rights statute should consider
in similar cases.
The R.M.A. majority’s pointing to the existence of Missouri’s
transsexual birth certificate statute was a good start—a very good start. It
cannot cancel out a notorious pre-Good instance of the Iowa Supreme Court
failing to acknowledge that state’s trans birth certificate statute (or anything
pointing to the legitimacy of trans existence), a failure which excluded trans
people from the scope of Iowa’s state sex anti-discrimination law.20 But with

17

Id. at 427 n.7 (Wilson, J.).
Id. at 433 (Fischer, C.J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 427 n.7 (Wilson, J.) (citing MO. REV. STAT. 193.215.9 (2019)).
20
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). Audra Sommers
brought suit on both sex and disability theories, losing on both. The Iowa Supreme Court
seemingly was so eager to close the courthouse door to transsexuals that it used language on
the disability prong so sweeping that the state, even after it had prevailed against Audra
Sommers, begged the court for a revision so as not to disadvantage all future disability
claimants. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing, Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337
N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (No. 2-68164). Sommers’ counsel shared that concern but, not
surprisingly, also sought to revise the outcome to Sommers’ benefit. Appellant’s Petition for
Rehearing, Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (No. 268164). The court did constrict the scope of its ruling but still chose to leave trans people as
18
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the very real possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court will knock down the
Price Waterhouse of cards that is federal trans anti-discrimination law,21 trans
people, legal practitioners and otherwise, need to be ready, willing and able
to use every element of trans-positive law that actually does exist—and to use
them in every conceivable way.
The phrase gender ideology22 has become a go-to conservative
scaremongering cudgel, a 21st century replacement for now-obsolete calls to
“protect the family” from marriage equality.23 Part II of this Article is a
reminder that the law Justice Wilson pointed to is not the product of anything
from the 21st century. Instead, Missouri’s General Assembly enacted it over
a third of a century ago, with Republicans in both the White House and the
Missouri governor’s mansion. Part III is a lesson in temporal proximity. Not
only does the vintage of the Missouri transsexual birth certificate statute stand
in contrast to persistent assumptions about the newness of the “trans agenda”

strangers to Iowa’s civil rights laws, a status quo that would hold for almost a quartercentury.
21
See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 (U.S. April 22, 2019) (certiorari granted both on the question
of the validity of trans claims based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989),
and its progeny, as well as whether trans people are per se covered under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2019).
22
Gillian Kane, ‘Gender Ideology’: Big, Bogus and Coming to a Fear Campaign Near You,
GUARDIAN (March 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/
30/gender-ideology-big-bogus-and-coming-to-a-fear-campaign-near-you.
The
phrase
“gender ideology” appeared in some form in many of the anti-trans briefs submitted to the
Court in Harris. See Brief Amici Curiae of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, et. al. at ix,
23; Brief Amici Curiae of Billy Graham Evangelical Association, et. al. at iv., 12; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Dr. Paul R. McHugh at iv, 31; and Brief of Scholars of Family and Sexuality
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 31 (all “gender ideology”); Brief of Scholars of
Philosophy, Theology, Law, Politics, History, Literature, and the Sciences as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 17, 19, 28; and Brief of National Media and Policy Groups that
Study Sex and Gender Identity as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers at 1, 29 (both
“gender identity ideology” and “gender ideology”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for
Arizona Policy in Support of Petitioner at 2, 20, 25, 29; and Brief of Amicus Curiae
Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioner at 3; Brief of Walt Heyer, et. al. in Support
of Petitioner at 8 (all “transgender ideology”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Women’s Liberation
Front in Support of Petitioner at 5 (“‘gender identity’ argument is an ideology”); and Amicus
Brief of Free Speech Advocates in Support of Petitioner at 1 (“totalitarian ideology of
transgenderism”).
23
See generally, Roger Severino, Pentagon’s Radical New Transgender Policy Defies
Common Sense, CNS NEWS (June 1, 2016, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnsnews.com/
commentary/roger-severino/pentagons-radical-new-transgender-policy-defies-commonsense.
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(another neo-scaremongering gem),24 it also places the law only a general
assembly session away from the session that enacted the MHRA provision at
issue in R.M.A. Part IV questions why it has taken this long for state-law
combinations of sex discrimination and transsexual birth certificates to add
up to at least some cracking open of courthouse doors for trans litigants.
One thing this article is not is an extensive examination of the entirety
of either the R.M.A. litigation or of the larger issue of younger trans people’s
equal access to the educational system. In no way should this be read as a
slight to them. They are, after all, the future. But they—as well as the rest of
us—should be able to benefit from all of what has come before. The article’s
conclusion will address the extent to which all of that—not just the trans birth
certificate statutes in and of themselves but how they logically should be
interpreted as positively enhancing state sex discrimination law—should
stand to benefit trans people even if the Supreme Court surprises everyone
by accepting the most trans-positive interpretations of Title VII.
For trans kids will one day be trans adults. Some of them may at some
point in their lives find themselves seeking work from businesses that
regularly employ less than fifteen people. Even if a legitimate25 incarnation
of the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)26 or the
Equality Act27 becomes law, it seems likely that, as Title VII now does, it
will only encompass those entities employing fifteen or more people. With
the MHRA filling the gap between businesses employing fifteen or more
people and those employing six or more, even the most trans-favorable EEOC
v. Harris Funeral Homes decision imaginable will not relegate the legal and
historical analysis set out in this article to the dustbin of arcane academic
discourse.

24

See generally, Stella Morabito, How the Trans-Agenda Seeks to Redefine Everyone,
FEDERALIST (June 23, 2014), https://thefederalist.com/2014/06/23/how-the-trans-agendaseeks-to-redefine-everyone/.
25
Read: trans-inclusive.
26
See generally, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st
Sess. (as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).
27
See generally, Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. NO. 116-56, at 1–2
(2019) (proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Act—with its fifteen-employee standard—
to include anti-LGBT discrimination).

2020

AFTER R.M.A. V. BLUE SPRINGS

7

I. MISSOURI’S 1984 TRANSSEXUAL BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATUTE
In 1986, sex was objectively defined by human reproductive nature.28
The anti-LGBT Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) spent three
pages of its R.M.A. amicus brief to the Missouri Supreme Court attempting
to support the above-quoted proposition.29 It cited the DSM-V and several
dictionaries.30 It also pointed to Missouri precedent31 approving the use of
dictionaries to discern the “plain meaning”32 of a term which lacks a
legislatively-supplied one. The 1983 Missouri Supreme Court opinion in
Sermchief v. Gonzales then served as the basis for the assertion: “The
meaning is to be discerned as of the time the law was enacted.”33
The ADF omitted much more regarding the Sermchief analysis of
legislative intent than it included. “Fundamentally, we seek to ascertain the
intent of the lawmakers and to give effect to that intent,” Justice Warren
Welliver wrote.34 He pointed to the manners in which a court might
accomplish that. One would be to attribute “to the words used in the statute
their plain and ordinary meaning.”35 Another would be to look to “the general
purposes of the legislative enactment.”36 Yet another would be to identify
both the problems that the legislature sought to remedy as well as the
circumstances and conditions existing at the time of enactment.37 Perhaps
28

Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18–
21, R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. (Mo. No. SC96683) (filed
March 26, 2018).
29
Id.
30
Almost one-third of the space is devoted to a footnote asserting that trans people and their
supporters are either confused or disingenuous about the appropriateness of introducing
intersex matters into discussions of trans issues. “[S]uch conditions are rare, objectively
diagnosable disorders of normal sexual development, and are quite unlike a theory of
subjectively perceived continuum of genders suggested by gender identity theory
advocates.” Id. at 19-20 n.10.
31
State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. 2010).
32
Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 28, at *18.
33
Id. (citing Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688-89 (Mo. 1983)).
34
Sermchief, 660 S.W.2d at 688.
35
Id. at 688 (citing Bank of Crestwood v. Gravois Bank, 616 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1981); Kieffer
v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1979); Beiser v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277 (Mo.
1979); State ex rel. Conservation Comm’n v. LePage, 566 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1978)).
36
Id. (citing Eminence R-1 Sch. Dist. v. Hodge, 635 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1982); Bank of
Crestwood, 616 S.W.2d at 510).
37
Id. at 688–89 (citing Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d at 918; State ex rel. Zoological Park Subdist. of
the City and County of St. Louis v. Jordan, 521 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1975); Mashak v. Poelker,
367 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1963)).
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most notably, Welliver added that amended statutes, such as the nursing
practice provisions at issue in Sermchief, “shall be construed on the theory
that the legislature intended to accomplish a substantive change in the law.”38
This portion of the article is not about any statutory changes that the
Missouri General Assembly made in 1986; Part III will examine those
changes. Instead, this portion is about one change that the Missouri General
Assembly made in 1984. That change, even without a progressive call-out to
textualism, undermines most, if not all, of the anti-trans arguments about the
General Assembly’s decision-making two years later. Sadly, as with similar
statutory changes in so many other states, it went all but unnoticed.
The Missouri Supreme Court issued Sermchief on November 22,
39
1983. Three weeks later S.B. 57440 was pre-filed for the 1984 session of the
General Assembly. Upon enactment in the spring, it became what Justice
Wilson referred to in R.M.A. as the acknowledgement by the Missouri
General Assembly that “one’s sex may not remain throughout a person’s life
what it was identified to be when that person was born.”41
With some modifications, this “Uniform Vital Statistics Law” was an
adoption of the 1977 Model State Vital Statistics Act.42 The language from
the Model Act that has been of interest to trans people is:
Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of (a court of
competent jurisdiction) indicating the sex of an individual
born in this State has been changed by surgical procedure and
that such individual’s name has been changed, the certificate
of birth of such individual shall be amended as prescribed in
Regulation 10.8(e) to reflect such changes.43
The Missouri language read in 1984 (and still reads):
38

Id. at 689 (citing City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441 (Mo.
1980); Kilbane v. Director of the Dep’t of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1976); and Gross v.
Merchants-Produce Bank, 390 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)).
39
See Sermchief, 660 S.W.2d 683.
40
1984 MO. S.B. 574 (approved April 24, 1984). See also 1984 MO. L. R. 2180.
41
R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 427, n.7 (Mo.
2019) (Wilson, J).
42
MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE 1977);
see also Memo from Governor’s Office re: SB 574 at 1, April 18, 1984, Office of the
Governor, Kit Bond Legislative Files [hereinafter Bond Legislative Files], RG-003, Box 25,
file SB 574, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, Missouri (the bill “is patterned after the
Model Vital Statistics Act adopted by the Council of State Governments”).
43
MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §21(e) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE
1977).
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Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction indicating the sex of an individual born
in this state has been changed by surgical procedure and that
such individual's name has been changed, the certificate of
birth of such individual shall be amended.44
A product of its time, it clearly privileges transition that includes surgery—
yet just as clearly it is a recognition by the State of Missouri that transition is
real and that the law of the State of Missouri recognizes that reality.
As significant as the statute is both for Missouri-born trans people and
for the general notion that transition is part of Missouri’s legal tapestry, it is
not clear if any trans people played any direct, overt role in spurring the
General Assembly to enact it.45 What is very clear, however, is that the
funeral industry did play a role in leading the General Assembly to look
favorably upon the Model Act:
The bill was mainly supported by the Funeral Directors
Association. Their interest was the elimination of the burial
permit. A less cumbersome notification system has replaced
the old system.46
Existing Missouri law required a funeral director to obtain a burial permit
from a local registrar before a body could be disposed:
This requires considerable time and expense of the funeral
director, especially when the local registrar is located at a
different town from the funeral director. Because of the burial
permit requirement, local registrars must provide a 24-hour
service for funeral directors which is also difficult.47
44

1984 MO. S.B. 574 at §193.215.8 (April 24, 1984) (codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT.
§193.215.9 (2019)).
45
Even in states where there was some degree of open participation in the legislative process
by trans people, often the stories behind such participation become obscured or lost. Katrina
C. Rose, Forgotten Paths: American Transgender Legal History, 1955-2009 (Ph.D. diss.
Univ. of Iowa 2018), 49-130 [hereinafter Forgotten Paths].
46
Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42, at 3. For burial permits in Missouri before 1984,
see generally 1947 MO. H.B. 65, §§ 28–30 (approved May 10, 1948) (“Uniform Vital
Statistics Act”). For a broader look at the topic, see Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me
Down in That Cold Cold Ground: The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human
Remains, 15 ELDER L. J. 381 (2007).
47
Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42, at 2. The burial permit issue was also of concern
when Colorado considered (and approved) the Model Act that same year. Hearing on S.B.
142, Feb. 9, 1984, Before the Senate Comm. on Heath Welfare & Institutions, Colorado
Legislature, Audio Source: Ampex 704 ‘Archives 84-8, 10:47 a.m., Feb. 7, thru, 8:02 a.m.,
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A representative of the funeral lobby inquired about having the bill signed
during a Funeral Directors Association meeting in early April. The timing
apparently was not right. Nevertheless, the association was seen as being
“most pleased” with the legislation.48
S.B. 574 also had support from the Missouri Hospital Association,
Missouri Medical Association, and Missouri Association of Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeons because the bill would modernize the vital records
system.49 Garland Land, Vital Records State Registrar, pointed out two
specific “deficiencies” in the then-existing statutory framework that S.B. 574
would address:
1. The present law requires us to use a procedure to amend
birth records which Social Security and other adjudicating
agencies find unacceptable. This causes great confusion
among the elderly who are trying to get Social Security
benefits. The bill provides an acceptable procedure for
amending records.
2. Our present law has a loophole that allows people to create
more than one birth certificate. This violates all recognized
principles of vital records recording. It is of particular concern
to us because birth records can be used for fraudulent purposes
to assume new identities. The bill corrects this problem.50
Land also pointed out that: “the bill addresses areas on which our present law
is silent. This will provide statutory authority for our present operating
procedures.”
He did not specifically mention changes of sex on birth certificates,
but legislative materials underlying other states’ adoption of the Model Act
during the early 1980s do. For example, a memo accompanying the bill that
Feb. 10,’ Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado (testimony of Christen Paulson) (copy
on file with author). A gap was seen between centralized death certificate issuance and local
burial permit issuance that could omit information the deceased’s physician(s) might know
which could shed light on whether a seemingly uneventful death should be viewed with
suspicion. Id. (testimony of Gabe Goldsmith).
48
Handwritten note, dated Apr. 3, 1984, on Written Testimony of Garland Land on S.B. 574
Pertaining to Vital Records, n.d. The written testimony has no date, but Land testified before
the House Governmental Review Committee on Feb. 14. Missouri Senate Weekly Bill Status
Report, Mar. 16, 1984 at 116–17; Mark Doerner, Summary of Committee Action on S.B.
574, n.d.
49
Id. at 1
50
Id.
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became New Mexico’s law in 1981 noted generally that the change of sex
provision came from the Model Act, but added:
This addition provides formal recognition of certificate
revisions occurring as a result of a surgically produced gender
change. The department has provided for this by regulations,
and currently revises six certificates per month. This addition
will provide guidance to attorneys and others on how to
proceed in amending the birth certificate.51
In Arkansas, which also put the Model Act into place in 1981, officials noted
that the new law would “reflect some of the social customs and practices that
are happening in Vital Records Registration,” in particular “surgical sex
changes.”52
Sen. Henry A. Panethiere, an attorney who had successfully
represented union officials before the U.S. Supreme Court two decades
earlier, was lead author of the Missouri bill.53 A Democrat from Kansas City
and first elected in 1976, he served four terms before being successfully
primaried in 1992.54 His only connection to anything LGB or T appears to be
the 1984 Vital Statistics bill via its transsexual provision.
Senate passage came on February 8 by a 33-0-1 margin.55 The House
passed it 137-0-25 on April 3.56 No legislators of either party in either
chamber voted against the bill, but nevertheless, two days after the House
vote, the Senate had the opportunity to vote on the bill again, this time
approving it 29-0-5.57 The reason for the trip back to the Senate was that some
in the House did have a problem with one particular element of the Model

51

Untitled memo on Vital Statistics Act bill dated Oct. 24, 1980 at 5, Governor Bruce King
Papers, 2nd Term, Coll. 1982-023, Box 47, Folder 910, New Mexico State Archives, Santa
Fe, New Mexico; see also Act of Apr. 9, 1981, ch. 309, 1981 N.M. Laws 1521 (1981).
52
Henry C. Robinson, Jr. to Joyce Warren, Sept. 10, 1980, Morriss M. Henry Papers,
Correspondence, Documents, and Papers, 1970-1985, Box 34, Folder 5 (Vital Statistics: Sept
10, 1980), University of Arkansas Special Collections, Fayetteville, Arkansas; see also
Arkansas Vital Statistics Act of 1981, ch. 120, 1981 Ark. Acts 250 (1981).
53
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
54
Kate Beem, Rep. DePasco Ousts Sen. Panethiere, INDEP. EXAM’R, Aug. 5, 1992, at 1.
(Panethiere died in 2005). Alumni Memoriam, U. OF MO. COLUM. SCH. OF L. TRANSCRIPT,
Spring 2006, at 37.
55
1984 MO. SENATE J. 244-45.
56
1984 MO. HOUSE J. 1028-29.
57
1984 MO. SENATE J. 790–91.
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Act’s language.58 So often, conventional gay rights wisdom has held that
trans issues are just too much for legislators to address prior to addressing, or
even just becoming educated on, non-trans LGB concerns. However, the
sticking point for S.B. 574 was not its transsexual provision.
Instead, it was the rhetoric of government control over women’s
reproductive rights that led to the divide. Foreshadowing the
terminologically-invasive politics of two generations later,59 the House
replaced the phrase “product of human conception” with “child” in the
definition of “live birth” and with “fetus” in the definition of “fetal death.”60
The vote in favor of this revision was 121-19-22.61
Governor Kit Bond subsequently signed S.B. 574.62 As was the case
with other conservatives who approved of such transition-recognition
legislation during the era,63 when later serving in Congress, Bond voted for
legislation which sought to restrict marriage recognition to those of
heterosexual couples only. In 1996, he voted for the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which became law.64 A decade later, he supported the proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which did not receive a sufficient
number of votes to be sent to the states for ratification.65
Section 193.215 has rarely been cited by appellate courts—with most
such references not being to the trans provision.66 Apart from the R.M.A.
58

1984 MO. House J. 1026–28 (121-19-22 vote to amend S.B. 574 by striking “product of
human conception” and adding “child” and “fetus”).
59
See 2019 MO. H. B. 126 (approved May 24, 2019), codified in relevant part at MO. REV.
STAT. §188.017.1 (2019) (“Right to Life of the Unborn Child Act”) (emphasis added).
60
Compare MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §§1(f)–(g) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUC., & WELFARE 1977) and 1984 MO. L. R. 2180 (proposed §§193.015(4) and (6)) with
1984 MO. S.B. 574 (enacted §§193.015(4) and (6)).
61
1984 MO. HOUSE J. 1027.
62
Governor Kit Bond News, memo dated Apr. 24, 1984 at 3 (only noting the modernization
aspect of the law); Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42.
63
See, e.g., 1984 COLO. ACTS. ch. 206. The underlying S.B. 142 was sponsored by then-State
Sen. Wayne Allard, who later supported the federal DOMA in the House and the FMA in
the Senate.
64
104 CONG. REC. S10129 (daily ed., Sept. 10, 1996) (rollcall vote).
65
109 CONG. REC. S5534 (daily ed., June 7, 2006).
66
Adoption of N.L.B. v. Lentz, 212 S.W.3d 123, 124 (Mo. 2007); Bowers v. Bowers, 2017
Mo. App. LEXIS 670 (Mo. App. June 30, 2017); C. L. v. M. T. , 335 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Mo.
App. 2011); Wilson v. Cramer, 317 S.W.3d 206 (Mo. App. 2010); M. T. v. C. L. , 274 S.W.3d
619 (Mo. App. 2009); Phillips v. Consol. Supply Co., 895 P.2d 574 (Idaho 1995) (non-trans
Idaho resident sought an order from a court of that state directing Missouri to amend his
Missouri birth certificate); see also Wolfe v. Missouri Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2006 U. S. Dist.
LEXIS 30156 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 2006).
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litigation, that has only been cited in trans cases from outside of Missouri—
twice—each merely as part of a string cite of trans birth certificate statutes in
general.67 J.L.S. v. D.K.S. involved the dissolution of a marriage in which
one spouse was trans, though the marriage was pre-transition.68
Consequently, there was no issue of the marriage’s validity based on the trans
spouse’s legal sex status at the time of the marriage.69 The transition,
however, clearly played a role in the breakdown of the relationship.70
The Missouri Court of Appeals made no reference to the General
Assembly’s implicit statement of transsexuality’s legitimacy71 when it
reversed aspects of the Circuit Court’s decree that treated the trans spouse
equitably72 and left intact a facially discriminatory visitation provision.
“[D]uring those periods in which the minor children are in the temporary
custody of Respondent, Respondent shall not cohabit with other transsexuals

67

In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83 n.8 (Md. 2003); Ex parte Delgado, 2005 TSPR 95 n.16 (P.R.
June 30, 2005).
68
State v. Palmer, 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App. 1997).
69
The documents in the case suggest that the trans spouse was not born in Missouri. This cis
spouse, however, was born in Audrain County. Trial transcript at 12, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”,
(No. CV193-3633DR) (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County). I am placing the initials in quotes
here and in other citations thereto because, even though the Court of Appeals maintained
their anonymity, the lower court documents do utilize the full names not only of the parties
but their children and witnesses.
70
And not merely between the spouses, though the cis spouse explicitly stated that it was the
primary reason for the dissolution. Trial transcript, supra note 69, at 13. A deposition shows
that the trans spouse’s father was in no way approving of the transition. When asked if the
use of the trans spouse’s post-transition name offended him, he answered in the affirmative
after asserting “I didn't name him that.” Transcript at 12, telephone deposition of “K. S.”,
May 2, 1994, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, No. CV193-3633DR (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County).
71
The appellate court placed the term “sex-reassignment” in scare quotes, as if to place it
outside the bounds of jurisprudence.
72
These included specific findings by the Circuit Court (1) that the cis parent had interfered
in the relationship between the children and the trans parent and (2) that “it would be in the
best interest and welfare of the minor children, that they be reunited with” the trans parent.
The Circuit Court also viewed the cis spouse to have been evasive when answering questions
as to whether she would even comply with the court’s order of visitation and temporary
custody. J. L. S., 943 S.W.2d at 771. It should be noted that the cis spouse’s therapist was
the “Ministries Director” of “Biblical Christian Counseling Ministries.” Supplemental Legal
File at 153-56, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, No. CV193-3633DR (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles
County). More broadly, the Circuit Court called into question all of the cis spouse’s experts
for having no experience at all with transsexuality issues and specifically called out the
“Ministries Director” for having “formed his opinions after one or two sessions with [cis
spouse] without ever seeing the children.” Amended Decree at 3-4, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”,
(No. CV193-3633DR) (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County June 20, 1995).
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or sleep with another female.”73 However, the circuit court placed no
analogous restrictions on the cis spouse’s cohabitation and sexual practices.
Despite this imbalance, the court of appeals blithely dismissed the trans
spouse’s assertion of that aspect of the decree being unconstitutional,
declaring “the court cannot ignore the effect which the conduct of a parent
may have on a child’s moral development.”74
Possibly the first instance of a court recognizing that a transsexual
birth certificate statute possesses meaning well beyond the realm of identity
recordation occurred in one of Missouri’s neighbors. The existence of a birth
certificate statute in Illinois allowed the state’s Supreme Court in 1978 to the
invalidate Chicago’s anti-crossdressing ordinance (at least as applied to
transsexuals) due to state supremacy principles. In City of Chicago v. Wilson,
Justice Thomas Moran reasoned that, via the legislature’s 1955 enactment of
a surgery-specific75 trans birth certificate statute:
[T]he legislature has implicitly recognized the necessity and
validity of such surgery. It would be inconsistent to permit
sex-reassignment surgery yet, at the same time, impede the
necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery. Individuals
contemplating such surgery should, in consultation with their
doctors, be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure
the correctness of their decision.76
This did not wholly wipe out the Chicago ordinance. It still remained as a
weapon for use against non-transsexuals.77
When Missouri’s trans birth certificate statute became law, St. Louis
still maintained an “indecent or lewd act” ordinance that contained explicit

73

Amended Decree at 5, “J. L. S.”, (No. CV193-3633DR).
J. L. S., 943 S.W.2d at 771.
75
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 1111/2, par. 73-17(1)(d)). The law has since been revised to
accommodate non-surgical transition. ILL. PUB. ACTS No. 100-360 (2017).
76
City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978).
77
However, Wilson did inspire a federal court in Texas to render Houston’s anticrossdressing ordinance similarly inoperable against transsexuals – despite Texas not having
a birth certificate statute. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S. D. Tex. 1980). The current
incarnation of the Chicago ordinance only deals with the amount of clothing worn, not the
type. CHICAGO MUN. CODE § 8-8-080 (2018), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/
Illinois/chicago_il/title8offensesaffectingpublicpeacemorals/chapter88publicmorals?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il$anc=JD_8-8-080
(successor provision to CHICAGO MUN. CODE § 192-8).
74
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anti-crossdressing language.78 However, that St. Louis ordinance never had
the opportunity to succumb to the Wilson legal theory.79 It instead fell when
challenged on broader constitutional grounds.80
That challenge resulted from a raid that occurred just as the General
Assembly was beginning its consideration of S.B. 574.81 Multiple elements
of the ordinance were challenged, though the crossdressing language appears
to have been easy for the federal district court to find unconstitutional in
1985.82 The Eighth Circuit disposed of the remaining language the next
year—in an opinion issued mere weeks after the MHRA legislation at issue
in R.M.A. became law.83
II. THE 1986 MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: INHERENT EXPANSIVENESS
AND LATTER-DAY CONSTRICTION
A relevant analysis of 1986 S.B. 513’s path to becoming the Missouri
Human Rights Act (MHRA)84 is rather straightforward. Proposed by Sen.
Wayne Goode, his chamber passed the bill on April 2 by a vote of 23-6, with
four senators absent and one absent with leave.85 Four weeks later, the House
passed the bill 142-9, with eleven representatives absent and one vacant
seat.86 House amendments caused the bill to go back to the Senate that same
day, which approved the bill 31-0, with three senators absent.87
The enacted statute defined “discrimination” as “any unfair treatment
based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates
78

ST. LOUIS CODE ORD. § 15.30.010 (1984) (prohibiting “appear[ing] in any public place in
a state of nudity or in a dress not belonging to his or her sex or in an indecent or lewd dress”).
79
It appears as though a larger group of plaintiffs, including a transitioning trans woman,
were at one point preparing to challenge the ordinance. Masquerade is Up for St. Louis Law,
GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, June 1984 at 1. This could have led to a Wilson-style challenge.
However, the ultimate focus of D. C. v. City of St. Louis was drag performers arrested in the
raid on a club known as Uncle Marvin’s.
80
D. C. v. City of St. Louis, No. 84-1152C(3) (E.D. Mo. order dated May 13, 1985) (“[O]nly
that portion of § 15.30.010 which makes it unlawful to appear ‘in a dress not belonging to
his or her sex’ is stricken, and the remainder of the ordinance is operative.”).
81
See Jim Thomas, St. Louis Bar Raided, GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1984 at 1; Jim
Thomas, Another St. Louis Bar is Raided, GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, March 1984 at 1.
82
D. C. v. City of St. Louis, No. 84-1152C(3) (E.D. Mo. order dated May 13, 1985).
83
Compare D. C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652, 653–55 (8th Cir. 1986); with S.B. 513,
83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986).
84
S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986).
85
1986 MO. SENATE J. 759–60.
86
1986 MO. HOUSE J. 2026–27.
87
1986 MO. SENATE J. 1751–53.
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to employment or handicap.”88 It spoke to discrimination in access to public
accommodations:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri are
free and equal and shall be entitled to the full and equal use
and enjoyment within this state of any place of public
accommodation,
as
hereinafter
defined,
without
discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or handicap.89
The 1986 MHRA included a lengthy, example-laden definition of “places of
public accommodation.” Of particular relevance, the definition encompassed:
Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on
behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision thereof, or
any public corporation; and any such facility supported in
whole or in part by public funds[.]90
That definition remained for the R.M.A. court to quote. There was no explicit
definition of “sex” for the court to quote—just as there had not been one in
1986.
That means that the General Assembly that year had not, as the
Alliance Defending Freedom claimed, “objectively defined” the word “sex”
by linking it to “human reproductive nature.”91 Yet, by addressing “sex” even
without providing an explicit definition, did the General Assembly not
provide the contours of a definition for the term that would more than justify
Justice Wilson’s R.M.A. footnote seven? The mere co-existence of a trans
birth certificate statute and a sex discrimination statute in the same
88

S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT.
213.010.2 (1986)) (emphasis added).
89
S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT.
213.065.1 (1986)) (emphasis added).
90
S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT.
213.010.11(e) (1986)).
91
Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 28, at 18-21. Additionally, even though
S.B. 98, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2017), S.B. 745, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess., (Mo. 2017), and S.B. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) did not
specifically target the MHRA, Chief Justice Fischer’s neglecting to mention the failure of
the General Assembly to pass either of those bills–which would have mandated a
chromosome-based “biological sex” standard for usage of public school restrooms, locker
rooms and shower facilities – makes his reliance upon similar legislative inaction toward a
decade’s worth of Missouri Non-Discrimination Act (MONA) bills appear to be somewhat
less than intellectually honest. R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist.,
568 S.W.3d 420, 432 n.4 (Mo. 2019).

2020

AFTER R.M.A. V. BLUE SPRINGS

17

jurisdiction’s body of law conclusively negates any argument for the
interpretive definition of “sex” sought by ADF and those of like antipathy for
trans people.92 That argument may be too broad for some. But even those
with such breadth should be willing to concede that when one state’s
legislative body positively addresses “change of sex” and “sex
discrimination” in close proximity to one another, the only legitimate
interpretation of “sex” in that state’s law is one that includes trans people and
the changes that occur during the course of their lives.
Even so, proximity may not be the end of the story—or, at the very
least, it may not enhance the story a great deal. Iowa’s legislature gave its
approval to transsexuality six years after it enacted a sex discrimination
statute. However, that six-year gap saw a significant turnover in legislative
membership. Barely a third of the legislators who approved of adding “sex”
to the Iowa Civil Rights Act in 1970 were there to offer any opinion on the
birth certificate bill that emerged from the 1975-76 session. Nevertheless, of
the 41 legislators who had the opportunity to vote on both, 27 of the
legislators voted in favor of both. Only two voted yes on sex discrimination
and no on the trans birth certificate statute; one split his votes in the opposite
direction. The remaining eleven were absent for either one or both votes.93
So while there is nothing in Iowa’s collective legislative history of the first
half of the 1970s to suggest opposition to reading the birth certificate statute
and the sex discrimination statute together, the actions of the legislators who
considered both bills are not conclusive positive proof either.
Missouri is a different matter. There, the trans birth certificate statute
and the MHRA bill were considered only two years apart—with only one

92

As I noted in 2004, the argument would be most forceful where trans-positive law
(typically, a birth certificate statute) precedes the “sex”-based civil rights legislation. Katrina
C. Rose, The Proof is in the History: The Louisiana Constitution Recognises Transsexual
Marriages and Louisiana Sex Discrimination Law Covers Transsexuals – So Why Isn’t
Everybody Celebrating?, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 399, 444-46 (2004). At the time, I was unaware
of Missouri having established its MHRA after it had enacted a trans birth certificate statute;
instead, the employment focus of that article was Louisiana’s replacement of its women’s
protection statutes with something that resembled a modern anti-discrimination regime – an
action that took place over a decade after it had enacted a birth certificate statute. Of equal
concern was ensuring that those who might be tempted to presume that anti-same-sexmarriage statutes and constitutional amendments intended to wipe out recognition of
transition understood that not only were transsexuals not the targets of such laws but that
many in the anti-same-sex-marriage camp had cast clear pro-transsexual votes in their pasts.
93
For a comparative breakdown of Iowa votes by legislator, see infra Appendix A.
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election cycle intervening.94 One hundred and sixty-one out of a possible 197
Missouri legislators (81.7% of seats) had the opportunity to vote in 1984 on
whether Missouri public policy positively acknowledges the reality of
transsexuality and then to vote in 1986 on whether the MHRA bill containing
the category of “sex” should become part of Missouri law. One hundred and
twenty-five of those 161 voted yes on both bills—meaning that over threequarters of those who did serve in both sessions voted yes on both and just
under two-thirds of the total number of legislators who could serve at any one
time voted yes on both.95
This does not prove that all 125 of the double-yes legislators
consciously intended to explicitly include “change of sex” within the
MHRA’s concept of “sex.”96 However, it should remove from the scope of
ethical argument any contentions such as that put forth by the ADF in its brief
as well as that put forth by Justice Fischer in the R.M.A. dissent. Tennessee
infamously inverted the intent of the Model Act in 1977 to produce a
hardwired statutory ban on allowing trans people’s birth certificates to reflect
the reality of transition. It should be beyond doubt that—had Missouri done
similarly in 1984—Fischer, the ADF and all who oppose the R.M.A.
majority’s holding would view the combination of the 1986 MHRA and a
1984 anti-transsexual birth certificate statute as conclusive proof that trans
people are beyond Missouri law’s boundaries of “sex.”
The Supreme Court’s “role is to declare the meaning of the language
used in the MHRA consistent with legislative intent.”97 The General
Assembly said yes in 1984 to the notion that Missouri law should accept and
acknowledge that “the sex of an individual [can be] changed by surgical
procedure.”98 Therefore, no argument regarding the use and interpretation of
the word “sex” as used in Missouri law should rely at all upon ordinary
94

In addition to the 1984 general election, there were also four resignations (Alex Fazzino,
Bob Fowler, David Scott and Robert Jackson) and two deaths (Roy Humphreys and D. R.
“Ozzie” Osbourn) in 1985. See 1986 MO. HOUSE J. 7.
95
For a comparative breakdown of Missouri votes by legislator, see infra Appendix B.
96
It is worth noting that, during his final term in the Senate, 1986 MHRA bill sponsor (and
yes vote on the 1984 trans birth certificate bill) Wayne Goode was a co-sponsor of one of
the earliest Missouri trans-inclusive civil rights bills. See S.B. 452, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2001).
97
R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 433 (Mo.
2019) (Fischer, J., dissenting).
98
1984 MO. S.B. 574, currently codified in relevant part at MO. REV. STAT. § 193.215.9
(2019).
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dictionary definitions of the word; and no such argument can ethically rely
on any dictionary definition of “sex” that does not take into account “change
of sex.” The importance of the breadth of “sex,” however, goes beyond 1984,
beyond 1986, beyond R.M.A., and even beyond the boundaries of Missouri
and its laws.
The 1986 MHRA incorporated much of the pre-existing
Discriminatory Practices Act.99 That 1965 Act did include “sex” among its
protective classifications. But it did stand apart from federal law. For
example, unlike Title VII it explicitly included “ancestry.”100 Yet not every
difference translated to enlargement of the courthouse doorway. The mere
existence of the MHRA has been deployed to prevent the usage of a public
policy exception to at-will employment termination.101 Critically though, the
1986 Act was regarded as a replacement of the 1965 Act despite existing
Missouri law and federal Title VII continuing to serve as some guidance,102
albeit not exclusively.103
Slightly over a decade ago, the Missouri Supreme Court firmly
detached the MHRA from federal law on a causational level. After Daugherty
v. City of Maryland Heights,104 plaintiffs would need to show only that the
complained-of adverse action targeting a protected characteristic was a
contributing factor in the entirety of the discriminatory activity being
challenged—not a motivating factor.105 Clearly, this was a development that
would benefit plaintiffs—at least in the abstract.
But then, in 2017, a very business-friendly General Assembly struck
back. Introduced by Sen. Gary Romine, S.B. 43 began with language that
99

William C. Martucci, et. al., Recent Developments in Missouri: Labor and Employment
Law, 55 UMKC L. REV. 539, 545 (1987),
100
S.B. 235, 73rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1965). Both continued into the MHRA.
See generally, Emily Crane, Employees Beware: How S. B. 43 Takes Missouri AntiDiscrimination Law Too Far, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 178, 182–83
(2018).
101
Joseph H. Knittig, Everything You Wanted to Know About Missouri’s Public Policy
Exception But Didn’t Know You Should Ask, 61 MO. L. REV. 949, 966 (1996) (citing Kramer
v. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317 (E. D. Mo. 1991); and Wyrick
v. TWA Credit Union, 804 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Mo. 1992)).
102
Martucci, et. al., supra note 99, at 546–47.
103
There are instances of straining to find parallel intent despite the lack of identical
language. See Letter from Chris Koster, Att’y Gen., Mo., to Lawrence G. Rebman, Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Labor and Indus. Rel. (Apr. 22, 2010) (on file with author).
104
231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007).
105
Crane, supra note 100, at 188–80; see also State ex. rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d
82 (Mo. 2003) (finding a right to a jury trial in MHRA cases).
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would have realigned the MHRA with federal law as to causation.106 In
committee, language crept in that would have not merely re-established an
equilibrium but instead would have hardwired a “but for” causation standard
into the MHRA. That precise language later disappeared, but an analogous
intent found its way in.
The end result of S.B. 43 was the term “because of” becoming defined
as “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the protected criterion was
the motivating factor”107 and “motivating factor” meaning that “the
employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse
action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision
or action.”108 As Emily Crane observed, “The codification of a but-for
causation standard suggests that the intent of Missouri lawmakers was not to
bring the state’s standard in line with analogous federal law, but instead to
heavily restrict plaintiffs’ ability to bring successful employment
discrimination claims.”109 Two years have passed, but the monumental task
that the wrongly-convicted face when forced to prove actual innocence110
should give all pause when pondering just how heavy that restrictiveness may
ultimately be.
Crane is not alone in noting how plaintiff-averse and defendantfriendly S.B. 43 is generally.111 The NAACP even issued a travel advisory
for Missouri when S.B. 43 was signed into law.112 Others—including many
who opposed the bill before it became law—pointed out that it seemed to be

106

2017 MO. S. B. 43 (as introduced).
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(2) (2019).
108
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(19) (2019) (emphasis added).
109
Crane, supra note 100, at 191.
110
See generally, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 386 (2013) (“tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare”) (Ginsburg, J. ); House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518, 538 (2006)
(“absolute certainty” not required, yet the relevant standard of proof is so demanding that it
rarely is met, citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995)) (Kennedy, J.).
111
See generally, Brian Stachowski, Senate Bill 43: Raising the Bar on Discrimination, ST.
LOUIS U. L. J. ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/201718/raising-the-bar-on-discrimination.php; Megan Crowe, Changes to the MHRA Raise
Burden of Proof and Limit Damages for Plaintiffs, SAINT LOUIS U. L. J. ONLINE (Oct. 30,
2017), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/changes-to-mhra-raise-burdenof-proof.php.
112
Travel Advisory for the State of Missouri, NAACP (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/yxt7ygqa.
107
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very friendly to one specific employer: the bill’s sponsor, Sen. Gary Romine,
owner of Show-Me Rent-to-Own in Sikeston.113
During 2017, that business was the subject of a racial discrimination
suit. A former employee had alleged that his supervisor regularly used racial
slurs—including telling the employee to “quit acting like a n*gger.” That
allegation was denied.114 However, lawyers did concede an accompanying
allegation: that there was a map on a store wall containing a circle around a
predominantly African-American neighborhood along with the words: “Do
not rent.”115
The personal interest that Romine had in the potential impact of S.B.
43 came to light rather early in the 2017 session—and “self-dealing” is one
of the kinder descriptions of the situation that one can find.116 Jay Benson,
president of the Missouri Association
of Trial Attorneys, viewed S.B. 43 and the many similar bills as together
comprising “an epidemic” in light of the manner in which “the civil justice
system is designed to hold people accountable when they do bad things.”117
University of Missouri-St. Louis political
scientist Dave Robertson said, “This kind of legislation just adds to the
perception that legislators are benefiting themselves and using government to
do it.”118
Not surprisingly, most Democrats opposed the bill, yet many refused
to vote on it at all, believing that even casting votes in opposition would make
them complicit in Romine’s conflict of interest.119 With Republican
majorities in the General Assembly, S.B. 43 nevertheless passed easily—
113
Sarah Fenske, Sued for Discrimination, Missouri Senator Pushes Law Limiting
Discrimination Suits, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/
newsblog/2017/04/12/sued-for-discrimination-missouri-senator-pushes-law-limitingdiscrimination-suits.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Kevin McDermott, Missouri Republicans’ Push to Limit Lawsuits Could Have
Unexpected Beneficiaries: Themselves, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://www.stltoday.com/%20news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-republicans-push-tolimit-lawsuits-could-have-unexpected-beneficiaries/article_74be21d5-7860-5223-84313fb6e10a6602.html.
118
Id.
119
Jason Hancock, Missouri Bill Making it Harder for Workers to Win Discrimination Cases
Goes to Greitens, KANSAS CITY STAR (May 8, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/news/
politics-government/article149421579.html.
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though not before an attempt to make lemonade out of the lemon. Farmington
Republican Rep. Kevin Engler proposed an amendment which would have
added sexual orientation and gender identity to the MHRA,120 essentially
tracking the intended effect of the long-languishing Missouri NonDiscrimination Act (MONA) proposal.121 He asserted that he was “disgusted”
that Missouri law allowed employers to fire someone “if you find out they’re
gay.”122 Ironically demonstrating the desirability of allowing LGBT people
clear access to MHRA remedies, Harrisonville Republican Rick Brattin
openly questioned whether gays are even human.123 Gay Kansas City
Democrat Greg Razer favored the amendment but, after Engler withdrew it,
another Kansas City Democrat, Brandon Ellington, criticized the entire
sequence of events as a “stunt.”124
Perhaps it was a stunt; perhaps it was not. The end result, however,
was clear. S.B. 43 became law without the language of MONA.
Engler’s attempt to attach pro-civil rights language to an anti-civil rights
proposal was, by no means, the first such stunt.
Despite not arriving until almost two decades after the first state trans
birth certificate statute—indeed not arriving until after four of them—the first
federal gay rights bill included no language designed to encompass anti-trans
discrimination.125 Such was the status quo for two decades—until the first
generation of failed “Equality Act” bills yielded to the employment-specific

120

S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017)., House Am. No. 1, proposed at 2017
MO. H.J. 2215 (May 8, 2017).
121
See generally, Alex Edelman, Show-Me No Discrimination: The Missouri NonDiscrimination Act and Expanding Civil Rights Protections to Sexual Orientation or Gender
Identity, 79 UMKC L. REV. 741 (2011).
122
Hancock, supra note 119.
123
Id. (“there is a distinction between homosexuality and just a human being”).
124
Id. By no means was it Engler’s first “stunt.” While in the Senate he floated a proposal
to make littering a capital offense. Paula Barr, Senator Engler Gets Attention He Wanted,
DAILY JOURNAL (Feb. 12th, 2009), https://dailyjournalonline.com/news/local/senatorengler-gets-attention-he-wanted/article_3f5729cb-c45b-5001-b68b-f468a7340265.html.
125
Equality Act of 1974, H. R. 14752, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Interestingly, this first federal
gay rights bill covered all areas of discrimination except in employment. See Bruce Voeller,
NGTF on Capitol Hill: An Historical Overview of the Program for Federal Gay Rights
Legislation, IT’S TIME, Special Bonus Issue (1976) at 1, 2. By 1974, Illinois, Arizona,
Louisiana and Hawaii had already enacted trans birth certificate statutes. 1955 ILL. LAWS. p.
1026; 1967 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 77; 1968 LA. ACTS Ch. 611; 1973 HAW. ACTS Ch. 39.
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Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) generation of failed bills. One
constant, however, was the exclusion of trans protections.126
The then-Human Rights Campaign Fund (HRCF—now known as
HRC) and Chai Feldblum, who played a significant role in drafting the
language of what came to be ENDA (and later served as an EEOC
commissioner), viewed what they were working with in the early 1990s as
reality.127 Trans people, however, dealt with a competing reality—one in
which far too many of their number were dying violently as the end result of
unemployment-based homelessness. “HRCF is intentionally allowing
transgendered people to die by pretending they don’t know it is happening,”
Cei Bell screamed in the Philadelphia Gay News.128 There was no willingness
to trust crumbs of theory while LGBs would, if a gay-only ENDA became
law, feast on clear, unequivocal statutory protections. For the remainder of
the Clinton Administration and on into the 21st century, trans people dug in
for a war on two fronts: against HRCF and against Congress, where there had
been little desire for any positive movement on civil rights under Democratic
control and where there was even less under the Republican leadership
produced by the disastrous 1994 mid-term elections.129
Truces can occur during wartime. Some between trans activists and
HRC(F) have materialized occasionally. In the run-up to a 1995 lobbying
event, activists and HRCF (just weeks away from dropping its “F”) issued a
joint statement indicating that the latter had “made a commitment to work
with representatives of a spectrum of the transgendered community with a
specific focus on hate crimes.”130 The statement went on to offer the hope of
126
See e.g. 97 CONG. REC. S1708 (daily ed., Sept. 9, 1981) (“‘[S]exual orientation’ means
male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by orientation or practice.”);
and Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1991. H.R. 1430, 102d Cong. (1991) (“‘Affectional or
sexual orientation’ means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by
orientation or practice, by and between consenting adults.”)
127
Chari R. Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All About Gender?, 17 N.Y.
L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623–702 (2000).
128
Cei Bell, Transgendered Persons Deserve Inclusion and Respect, PHILADELPHIA GAY
NEWS, July 21, 1995, at 11.
129
See generally, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
160, § 571 (Nov. 30, 1993) (Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell); Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 1994, S. 2238, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced June 23, 1994) (first ENDA bill); Adam
Clymer, G. O. P. Celebrates its Sweep; Clinton Vows to Find Common Ground, New York
Times, Nov. 10, 1994 at A1.
130
Kristina Campbell, Transgender Lobbyists Meet with Hill Staffers, WASH. BLADE, Oct.
6, 1995.
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“good faith” in a future of dialogue-engagement and coalition-building “in
the context of ending violence and discrimination against [the trans]
community.”131 Any focus on hate crimes would certainly address the former.
The absence of any serious work on ENDA was a sore poised to do nothing
but fester. Even so, following the meeting, Texas trans activist and attorney
(and later judge) Phyllis Frye publicly declared, “There’s a very good chance
the war with HRCF may be coming to a close.”132
The politics of 1996 delayed the inevitable of Frye and her followers
learning how far off the mark her prediction was.133 President Bill Clinton
was running for re-election, and the Republican congressional leadership saw
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage litigation134 as a wedge issue that could damage
his chances. Republicans reflexively proposed legislation that purported to
insulate the federal government and dissenting states from having to
recognize same-sex marriages, should any state begin allowing them.135 This
was, of course, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and it passed with
ample Democratic support in addition to the votes of the Republican
majorities. Clinton signed the bill to prevent a veto from being used against
him in the election.136
DOMA proved to be about more than just marriage. As Feldblum
describes it, the Republican leadership wanted to bring the bill up for a vote
as an embarrassment to all Democrats. However, they wanted no
amendments that might spread the embarrassment around, such as gun
control or health care. Sen. Ted Kennedy brokered a deal to stop all

131

Id.
David Olson, Transgendered Activists Meet with Local, National Gay Groups, WINDY
CITY TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995 at 10 (sec. 1).
133
See generally, Katrina C. Rose, Has the Future Already Been Forgotten? A Post-2007
Transgender Legal History Told Through the Eyes of the Late, (Rarely) Great Employment
Non-Discrimination Act, 23 WILLIAM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 527– 637 (2017) [hereinafter
Future Already Been Forgotten?].
134
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), resolved as moot sub. nom., Baehr v. Miike,
994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
135
Defense of Marriage Act, P. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996).
136
This aspect of DOMA’s history re-emerged in presidential politics two decades later.
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Hillary Clinton’s Claim that DOMA Had to be Enacted to Stop an
Anti-Gay Marriage Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/oc2235p; Amanda Renteria, e-mail dated Oct. 25, 2015, quoted in e-mail
chain posted at WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/4957 (last visited
Apr. 30, 2020); Chris Johnson, He Said, She Said, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 30, 2015 at 1.
132
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amendments except one: ENDA.137 The resulting votes showed the gulf
between employment and marriage. DOMA passed 85-14 while ENDA failed
50-49, meaning over thirty senators voted for both.138
The deal proved to have long-lasting ramifications not only for
marriage equality and ENDA but also for the relationship between trans
people and HRC. The organization came to lean upon the razor-thin failure
margin of the 1996 ENDA vote as a justification for not altering the LGBonly ENDA paradigm.139 Many trans activists countered that it had not even
been a ‘true vote’ but instead merely political theater to create the appearance
of progress—both for senators who wanted to have it both ways with respect
to their gay rights record and for HRC itself in the face of a pre-determined
reality of ENDA not having any chance of being considered by the Newt
Gingrich-led House.140
Over a decade passed before ENDA proposals became transinclusive—but the 2007 bill proved to be no more of a “true” inclusive bill
than what occurred in the Senate in 1996 had been a “true” vote. The baitand-switch of 2007 was the last serious consideration of civilian LGBT antidiscrimination legislation at the federal level.141 A trans-inclusive ENDA did
pass the Senate in 2013—while Republicans were in firm control of the
House.142 Similarly, a trans-inclusive, second-generation Equality Act bill
passed the House in 2019—with Republican control ensuring that the Senate
is a graveyard for civil rights proposals.143
The result? When the Missouri Supreme Court issued its R.M.A.
decision in 2019, federal statutory law was still as free of explicit
employment anti-discrimination protections for LGBT people as it was when
Bella Abzug’s first “Equality Act” bill died 45 years earlier.

137

Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in JOHN D’EMILIO,
WILLIAM B. TURNER AND URVASHI VAID, EDS., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), pp. 149, 84-85. The House never took up ENDA for
consideration in 1996.
138
104 CONG. REC. S10129 (Sept. 10, 1996) (rollcall vote no. 279 Leg.).
139
Tracy Baim, HRC: Birch on Trans Issues, OUTLINES, Sept. 1, 1999 at 14.
140
Vanessa Edwards Foster, More HRC and Trans Issues, OUTLINES, Sept. 22, 1999 at 6.
141
Future Already Been Forgotten?, supra note 133, at 576–94.
142
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st Sess.
143
See generally, EQUALITY ACT, H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (Rpt. 116–56) (proposed
amendment to the Civil Rights Act with its 15-employee standard—to include anti-LGBT
discrimination).
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In 1993, sexual orientation, defined trans-inclusively, became part of
the MHRA.144 The bad news for Missouri is that the addition was to
Minnesota’s MHRA.145 Good news did follow, but not until 1999. A slightly
modified version of Minnesota’s trans-inclusive definition of sexual
orientation was added to Missouri’s law governing hate crimes.146 It was at
this time that efforts began to seek to add a similarly trans-inclusive category
of sexual orientation to Missouri’s MHRA.147 Here, one must return to bad
news: no such bill has ever become law. Even worse, the hate crime statute
has a track record of proving to be impotent in preventing violence against
trans people.148
While in law school, future R.M.A. counsel Alex Edelman authored a
note on MONA, which even by 2011 had suffered through more than a
decade of legislative indifference. Advocating for that indifference to
transmute to positive action, Edelman implored, “As long as the existing
human rights laws fail to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity, some citizens will continue to live in fear of
discrimination.”149
144

1993 MINN. LAWS Ch. 22. § 2.
1993 MINN. LAWS Ch. 22.
146
1999 MO. S. B. 328, relevant definition codified at MO. REV. STAT. 556.061(46) (2019).
The Missouri trans clause differs from Minnesota’s in that it uses “not traditionally
associated with one’s gender” rather than “not traditionally associated with one’s biological
maleness or females.” MINN. STAT. §363A. 03, subd. 44 (2019). Notably, the Missouri Hate
Crime bill, as introduced, did use Minnesota’s phraseology. 1999 MO. S. B. 328 (as
introduced).
147
See generally, 2000 MO. S. B. 622 (“biological maleness or femaleness”). A decade would
pass before such proposals would have distinct “sexual orientation” and “gender identity”
categories. See 2012 MO. S. B. 798; 2012 MO. H. B. 1500.
148
The murder of trans teen Ally Steinfeld has resulted in two guilty pleas, with a third person
charged with first degree murder and set to stand trial in 2020—three years after the killing.
Jackie Rehwald, Ally Steinfeld Case: Third Suspect Pleads Guilty in Texas County
Transgender Teen Murder Case, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (May 9, 2019),
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/crime/2019/05/09/trans-teen-ally-steinfeldmurder-case-girlfriend-briana-calderas/1151486001/. However, the hate crime provision is
not even available for Missouri prosecutors who might actually want to use it in conjunction
with a murder charge—something the Steinfeld prosecutor seemed disinclined to even
consider in the abstract. Max Londberg, Missouri Law Doesn’t Allow Hate Crime Charges
in Transgender Teen’s Brutal Slaying, KANSAS CITY STAR (Oct. 4, 2017, 9:40 AM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article176919421.html. Adding insult to the
dead, the other charges in the killing—armed criminal action, abandonment of a corpse and
tampering with physical evidence—also fell outside of the purview of hate crime
enhancement. Rehwald, supra.
149
Edelman, supra note 121, at 741.
145
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Edelman offered a primer on the mechanics of bringing a complaint before
the Missouri Commission on Human Rights.150 He also laid out the specifics
of what the long-languishing MONA151 would add to the MHRA, including
language addressing perception of a victim’s relevant traits.152 His article
went on to highlight developments in federal law—from Price Waterhouse
through Schroer v. Billington.153 “While this is promising,” Edelman wrote,
“it is not nearly enough,”154 going on to describe as “Kafkaesque” the
interplay between potentially viable sex discrimination claims and animus
toward the uncovered specific characteristics of sexual orientation and gender
identity that a discriminator could actually use to get away with
discriminatory activity.155
Edelman valiantly argued that enactment of MONA would give
LGBT Missourians clear recourse against discrimination. “By punishing
discrimination,” he reasoned, “the government indicates its disapproval of
that type of discrimination.”156 The converse should be true as well: a
statement of positivity by the government should connote approval.
Throughout all of his arguments about why “MONA is right for
Missouri,”157 including an extensive plea to not view MONA as being
incompatible with religious rights, nowhere will one find the first plank of
(LGB)T rights in Missouri: the state’s recognition of transition. “Missouri
may not seem a likely place to expand the rights of LGBT Americans.”158 It
might appear a bit more likely—even to the state’s legislators—if the relevant
audience is presented with the fact that, at least for trans Missourians, the
process began during Ronald Reagan’s first term as president.

150

Id. at 742.
Alex Edelman specifically referenced the 2010 Senate bill. 2010 MO. S. B. 626.
152
Edelman, supra note 121, at 744–46.
153
Id. at 746–47 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp.
2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008)).
154
Edelman, supra note 121, at 747.
155
Id. at 748.
156
Id. at 749.
157
Id. at 750–54.
158
Id. at 756.
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III. FROM DICTA TO SUBSTANCE
It seems obvious to the court that if a state permits such a change of sex on
the birth certificate of a postoperative transsexual, either by statute or
administrative ruling, then a marriage license, if requested, must issue to
such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled.159
Ohio has never enacted a trans birth certificate statute. However, in
1987, Stark County Probate Court Judge Denny Clunk offered his thoughts,
quoted above, on how courts in states that have done so should rule in cases
involving opposite-sex trans marriages. Opponents of trans rights eagerly cite
the ultimate negative decision in the case.160 To them, the decision is proof
that transition recognition is all but alien to American jurisprudence.161 It is
not alien, but it has been ignored.

159

In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Probate Ct. Stark Co. 1987).
For court opinions favorably citing Ladrach without noting the pro-trans dicta, see
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 228-29 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied), cert.
denied, 531 U. S. 872 (2000); In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 130 (Kan. 2002); In re Nash and
Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 and 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, 898
So.2d 80 (2005); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (nontrans case but nevertheless uncritically accepting the ultimate outcome of Ladrach). For
similar citations in scholarly and advocacy settings, see generally Mathew D. Staver,
Transsexuality and the Binary Divide: Determining Sex Using Objective Criteria, 2 LIB. U.
L. REV. 459, 464 n.17, 466, 478–79 (2008); Marika E. Kitamura, Once a Woman, Always a
Man? What Happens to the Children of Transsexual Marriages and Divorces?: The Effects
of a Transsexual Marriage on Child Custody and Support Proceedings, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD
& FAM. ADV. 227, 231 (2005); Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and
Female in Marriage Statutes, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 351 (2005). The Ladrach decision
was also cited against marital equality in litigation not involving trans people. See generally
Answer Brief of Campaign for California Families on the Merits at 52-52 n.39, In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
161
It is worth noting that Staver has, on multiple occasions inaccurately cited pro-transition
case law for the proposition that transition recognition is a notion alien to the law. Staver,
supra note 160, at 464 n.17; Answer Brief, supra note 160, at 52 n.39 (each identically
asserting that M. T. v. J. T., 355 A. 2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976) stands for the
proposition that “male <sic> transsexual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery may not
be considered female for marital purposes” when in fact the decision validated a marriage
between a cis male and a trans woman). I cannot determine whether the inaccurate citing was
intentional, but a decade later Staver and his Liberty Counsel organization were called out
by the U. S. Supreme Court Clerk’s Office for misgendering case party Gavin Grimm.
Compare Scott S. Harris (by Denise McNerney) to Mat Staver, letter dated Feb. 24, 2017;
with Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Judith Reisman and the Child Protection Institute in Favor of
Petitioner, Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273).
160
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In 1995 Maryland enacted legislation which was not a wholesale
adoption of the Model Act but was an effort to update its vital statistics
framework.162 It was an update that included portions of the Model Act,
among them the transition-recognition subsection.163 Pennsylvania-born
Janet Heilig Wright attempted to make use of the statute while living in
Maryland.164 Lower courts said she could not utilize the law but Maryland’s
highest court, construing the case as presenting primarily a jurisdictional
question, ruled in her favor. In 2003, Judge Alan Wilner noted both the
paucity of legislative history for his state’s law as well as an almost nonexistent amount of available history for the language within the Model Act
itself.165 Almost going—but now not merely in dicta—where Denny Clunk
had gone in Ladrach a quarter century earlier, Wilner viewed the General
Assembly’s usage of the transition language as speaking for itself:
[It] is clear that, in enacting § 4-214(b)(5), the Legislature
necessarily recognized the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts to
consider and grant petitions to declare a change in gender;
indeed, that section could have no other rational meaning.166
The public policy underlying the 1995 law may have given Maryland courts
the authority to grant gender change judgments for any Maryland resident
who so petitions, but the court would not “opine on what the collateral effect
of any judgment attesting to a change in gender might be.”167 Consequently,
162

1995 MD. LAWS Ch. 97.
MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §21(d) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., &
WELFARE 1992). The language was evident in the bill despite the bill title not directly calling
attention to it. The committees that heard the bill, however, were made aware of it. Maryland
General Assembly, House Environmental Matters Comm. Doc. on 1995 H. B. 1068 at 3–4.
On March 21, the bill passed the House 136-0 (with three delegates not voting and two
absent). House vote tally, 1995 H. B. 1068 (legislative date March 19, 1995). The
Environmental Matters Committee vote had been 20-0. Voting Record, H. B. 1068, March
16, 1995. On April 4 the Senate approved the bill 46-0 with one senator not voting. Senate
vote tally, 1995 H. B. 1068 (legislative date April 2, 1995). The Economic and
Environmental Affairs Committee vote had been 11-0. Voting Record, H. B. 1068, March
30, 1995. Gov. Parris Glendenning signed the bill into law.
Bills in 1996 and 1997 to add birth certificate privacy safeguards to the gender transition
process – as well as to address more specific complaints that certificates amended pursuant
to the 1995 guidelines looked fake – did not meet with similar success, each dying quickly
in committee. 1996 MD. H. B. 323; 1997 MD. H. B. 323.
164
In re Heilig, 816 A. 2d 68, 69 (Md. 2003).
165
Id. at 82.
166
Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
167
Id. at 85. A lengthy footnote noting the differing views in common law-based
jurisdictions—recognition vs. anti-recognition—ended with the reiteration that, in light of
163
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Wilner and his unanimous court still stopped short of fully adopting Clunk’s
dicta as Maryland law.168
“When I argued the Heilig case, the Court inquired about the issue of
surgery,” attorney Alyson Meiselman recalled. “My reply was the trial court
never allowed the case to get that far, as to presenting evidence. However, I
did argue that the change had to have a level of permanency.”169 Opinions
vary among trans people on that matter, as well as on what constitutes
sufficient permanence for transition. Thomas Beatie’s pregnancies—after
having conformed his Hawaii birth certificate to reflect a male identity—
angered and frightened many, but not all, trans people.170 Dean Spade
declared that Beatie’s legal sex status could not be questioned.171 Yet it was,
albeit ultimately unsuccessfully.
When Beatie and his wife sought a divorce in Arizona, a trial court
judge had trouble fitting a marriage between “a female [Nancy] and a person
capable of giving birth, who later did so [Thomas]” into Arizona’s definition
of marriage.172 He impugned the affidavit Thomas had relied upon to secure
his male Hawaii birth certificate, pointing out not only that it merely indicated
he had undergone unspecified “surgical procedures.” He also pointed to
Thomas’s non-disclosure of the retention of his ability to become pregnant.173
The court of appeals took a different view and managed to do so
without questioning Arizona’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.174
the case brought by Wright being only a petition for gender change and not a request for a
marriage license, marriage “is an issue that is not before us in this case and upon which we
express no opinion. ” Id. at 85–86 n.9.
Maryland never fell victim to an anti-same-sex marriage constitutional amendment, but it
had enacted one of the earliest state DOMA laws. 1973 MD. LAWS Ch. 213. Consequently,
in 1995—as well as at the time of Heilig—sex status for purposes of marriage validity was
a live issue in the state. And four years after Heilig, Wilner was part of the Court of Appeals
majority which kept Maryland from joining the list of states that judicially opened marriage
to same-sex couples. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A. 2d 571 (Md. 2007).
168
In re Heilig, 816 A. 2d 68, 85 (Md. 2003).
169
Alyson Meiselman, comment in TransMaryland Facebook group, Sept. 20, 2014
(accessed Sept. 21, 2014 (on file with author)).
170
THOMAS BEATIE, LABOR OF LOVE: THE STORY OF ONE MAN'S EXTRAORDINARY
PREGNANCY (2008), 254; Leigh Smith, Transfags and Bigotry, ENOUGH NON-SENSE (Nov.
17, 2008, 7:40 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20090310113658/http://tgnonsense.word
press.com/2008/11/17/transfags-and-bigotry/.
171
Jen Christensen, Trans Positions, ADVOCATE (May 3, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.advocate.com/news/analysis/2008/05/03/trans-positions.
172
Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754, 756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
173
Id. at 757.
174
Id.
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Judge Kenton Jones examined two of the four oldest transsexual birth
certificate statutes. Arizona’s own was relevant given the location of the
divorce action, but Hawaii’s governed Thomas’s identification
documentation and the validity of the marriage when and where it was
performed. Both, at relevant times, specified “sex change operation.” Jones,
however, observed that the Hawaii statute required:
[O]nly that an examining physician provide an affidavit, and
that the affidavit indicate “the birth registrant has had a sex
change operation and the sex designation on the birth
registrant's birth certificate is no longer correct.” In
accordance with [the statute], Thomas provided the State of
Hawaii with an affidavit from Dr. Brownstein verifying he had
undergone a sex change operation, as well as extensive
hormonal and psychological treatment, and that the specific
procedures and treatment qualified Thomas to be “legally
considered male.” Therefore, Thomas complied with the
statute.175
Jones then compared Hawaii’s legal framework to Arizona’s. Surprisingly,
he concluded Arizona’s was even more liberal than Hawaii’s. This was based
primarily on evidentiary niceties; Hawaii required an affidavit, but Arizona
only required a written statement:
Arizona’s statute does not require specific surgical procedures
be undertaken or obligate the applicant to forego procreation.
As such, the sworn affidavit Thomas presented to the Director
of the Hawaii Department of Health toward obtaining an
amended birth certificate also met the requisites of Arizona’s
own statutory provision.176
175

Id. at 758.
Id. at 759–60. Oddly enough, the two statutes Jones analyzed no longer consisted of their
original wording. A 2004 rewrite of Arizona’s 1967 statute saw the substitution of “sex
change operation” for the original “surgical operation.” 2004 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 117, § 8.
Hawaii’s statute had undergone a similar revision a quarter century earlier, with “sex change”
being added to modify “operation.” 1979 HAW. ACTS No. 130. Five years later, the section
was reorganized, but with the “sex change operation” provision remaining substantively
unchanged. 1984 HAW. ACTS No. 167. Arguably then, neither change was truly a
liberalization but instead more of a specification. The initial version of the Hawaii statute,
from 1973, included separate provisions for where “the sex item on the person’s birth
certificate was entered incorrectly” and for where “by reason of [an] operation the sex
designation on such person’s birth record should be changed.” The House Health Committee
176
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Consequently, not only was Thomas’s status as a male—and in turn the
Hawaii marriage—recognized as real but the Arizona divorce action was
allowed to proceed, demonstrating that even where a trans birth certificate
specifies surgery, there is more than a little room for disagreement as to what
qualifies. The Arizona Court of Appeals was clear that, for a trans man, the
ability to give birth did not legally negate any procedures that may have taken
place.
Notably, Jones made an effort to ensure that a then-recent observation
by the Chief Judge Michael J. Davis of the District of Minnesota would not
be as easily ignored and forgotten as Denny Clunk’s Ladrach dicta has been.
“The only logical reason to allow the sex identified on a person’s original
birth certificate to be amended,” Davis wrote in 2012 and which Jones quoted
alongside Clunk, “is to permit that person to actually use the amended
certificate to establish his or her legal sex for other purposes, such as
obtaining a driver’s license, passport, or marriage license.”177
The only logical interpretation of a state statutorily allowing the sex
identified on a person’s original birth certificate to be amended is that the sex
has changed, not just from male to female (or vice versa) for individual trans
people but for the laws of the states whose legislatures have approved. It is
all change, and it is all “sex.” But it should not all be constrained within birth
certificates. And none of it should ever have been constrained by selectively
conservative use of dictionaries. But so often it was.
An important element of the history of the nation’s first transinclusive state civil rights law is an all-but-forgotten vignette of how the
nation’s first trans-inclusive civil rights city ordinance178 almost was stripped
of its trans-inclusivity. The scant reporting on the series of events in 1980

report, however, only refers to “corrections,” implying the sort of distinction between transspecific statutes and those of the variety that so many courts have refused to interpret in
transsexuals’ favor. Nevertheless, that could have been only for brevity as the committee
also seems to have been aware of the sort of concern transsexuals have regarding
identification documents: “As certified photostatic copies are preferred directly from the
corrected records, they remain potential sources of embarrassment – particularly in the case
of changed father’s name, previously incorrectly designated sex, etc.” 1973 HAW. S. C. REP.
432 on H. B. 154, reprinted at 1973 HAW. HOUSE J. 939.
177
Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754, 760 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Radtke v.
Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local No. 638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund,
867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1034 (D. Minn. 2012)).
178
MINNEAPOLIS ORD. of Dec. 30, 1975, pp. 1216-37, amending MINNEAPOLIS ORD. of
March 29, 1974.
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which almost led to revising the 1975 ordinance in a manner that would have
left its key suspect class category definition without its trans clause179 offered
much evidence of finger-pointing regarding who was or was not to blame for
a draft re-write that did not contain trans-inclusive language. That reporting,
however, serves up no conclusive answer, either as to who or as to why. It
may have been an intentional attempt to erase the trans stain from one of the
nation’s earliest gay rights laws while no one was paying close attention. Or
it may have been merely a benign, albeit misguided, attempt to make the
wording of the ordinance better. It may even have been mere laziness or
sloppiness on the part of whoever provided copies of the ordinance180 to those
intending to draft new language.181 Ultimately, the 1975 incarnation of the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance survived intact and served as a transinclusive model when Minnesota enacted a statewide measure in 1993. No
erasure occurred, but the eraser was there for the using.
Judicial reliance upon dictionaries to maintain trans people’s position
as strangers to remedial law could merely be evidence of laziness. Reliance
on dictionaries to prop up the constrictive imaginary of a past that likely never
existed is at best symptomatic of a cowardice that fails not merely trans
people but society as a whole. At worst, it evidences blatant bigotry. The real
history of the trans law that already exists, though not erased in the strictest
sense, is obscured from the view of those who have a right to know about it
by those who have an obligation to, at the very least, acknowledge its
existence. The real lives of real people become lost in a never-ending debate.
Do dictionaries define the world in which people exist? Or do people and
their lives define what is real, with dictionaries merely being lexicological
scriveners of that reality? And if not people and their lives, what about their
pets?
Not until March 2019 did the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) deem
the modern incarnation of the word “puggle”—describing a breed of dog that
179

Wording that, a generation later, found its way into Missouri’s hate crime law.
Bear in mind that this was long before the everyday lives of legal professionals included
Westlaw, LEXIS or what we know today as the internet. One professed excuse for the wrong
language coming into play was the City of Minneapolis providing an out-of-date hardcopy
of the ordinance language to someone involved with the revision effort.
181
Katrina C. Rose, Reflections at the Silver Anniversary of the First Trans-Inclusive Gay
Rights Statute: Ruminations on the Law and its History—and Why Both Should be Defended
in an Era of Anti-Trans ‘Bathroom Bills,’ 14 U. MASS. L. REV. 70, 99-101 (2019) [hereinafter
Reflections].
180
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is a cross between a pug and a beagle—to be sufficiently legitimate for
inclusion. The announcement of this addition (among many others) to the
OED included an acknowledgement of at least some familiarity with that
incarnation of “puggle” from as early as 2002.182 But given that the OED’s
2002 reference source is a Wisconsin State Journal classified ad for puggle
pups,183 one should be willing to presume that, well before 2002, plenty of
encounters between pugs and beagles resulted in puppies. Did humans have
a dictionary-mandated responsibility to wrongly tell those resultant puggles
that they did not actually exist?184
The gap between that 2002 Wisconsin State Journal classified ad and
the addition of “puggle” to the OED was 17 years. Over the course of
travelling 17 times ‘round the seasons185 I was born, and I completed
elementary, junior high, and all but my final semester of high school. At the
beginning of that journey, Lyndon Johnson was president; at the end, Ronald
Reagan. In between, I came to terms with who I am; through mainstream
news sources I learned I was not alone—even in Houston, Texas.186
During the 17 years preceding the Iowa Supreme Court’s declaration
in Sommers that “by proscribing discrimination on account of sex the
legislature did not intend that the term would include transsexuals,”187
Sixteen American state-level jurisdictions enacted legislation recognizing
change of sex.188 Iowa was one of those. But its own high court affirmed a
182

Johnathan Dent, New Words in the OED: March 2019, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(BLOG), March 18, 2019, https://public.oed.com/blog/new-words-in-the-oed-march-2019/.
183
Puggle, n.2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed. com/view/Entry/
78414912.
184
Full disclosure: I have never owned a puggle. However, during a portion of my doctoral
studies, some research from which I have utilized in this Article, two pugs were part of my
family. Rose, Forgotten Paths, supra note 45, at vii.
185
Apologies to Joni Mitchell, The Circle Game, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise 1970).
186
Long before I became aware of how close she came to being the first trans litigant to have
a case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court, Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denial of
certiorari, Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial), I was aware of Ann Mayes via frequent
mainstream news coverage. See generally, Phil Hevenee, Whatever Happened to Toni Mayes
After He <sic> Became Ann Mayes?, HOUSTON POST, April 1, 1978. This is in addition to
my becoming aware of an athlete via her attaining cultural ubiquity in 1976—not Caitlyn
Jenner, but Renee Richards. See generally Ray Kennedy, She’d Rather Switch—And Fight,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 6, 1976 at 17–19.
187
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (No. 268164).
188
Arizona (1967), Louisiana (1968), Hawaii (1973), Utah and North Carolina (both 1975),
Iowa (1976), California (1977), Michigan (1978), Virginia (1979), Guam (1980), Arkansas,
D. C. , Massachusetts, New Mexico and Oregon (all 1981) and Georgia (1982). These 16 are
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trial court decision that rested entirely on a dictionary definition of “sex,”189
falling back upon the already-lengthy string of anti-trans Title VII
decisions190 even while crowing about Iowa civil rights law not being bound
by federal limitations.191 When the trial court concluded that “the word or
term ‘sex’ must be construed according to its accepted usage,”192 the 1976
Iowa statute memorializing the Iowa Legislature’s acceptance of the reality
of change of sex should have been front-and-center. However, it was nowhere
to be found. Not only was the question of whether that acceptance by the
Iowa Legislature had an effect on state sex discrimination law left
unanswered by Sommers; it was never even asked.193

in addition to the 1955 Illinois statute. For an examination of the extent to which this body
of pro-transsexual law went unnoticed in the late 1970s and early 1980s even in pro-civil
rights circles, see Reflections, supra note 181, at 130 n.328 (2019). For one of the only other
analyses of how the body of trans-positive birth certificate statutes came to be, see Jami K.
Taylor, Barry L. Tadlock, and Sarah Poggione, State LGBT Rights Politics Outliers:
Transsexual Birth Certificate Laws, 34 AM. REV. OF POLITICS 245 (2013) (attempting to
provide a cohesive political science explanation for why certain states enacted such statutes).
189
The trial court judge, Dick Strickler, did not provide a citation to the specific dictionary
from which he quoted. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CL-38-21968 at 1 (Iowa
Dist. Ct. Polk Cty. Jan. 14, 1982) (“Either of two divisions or organisms distinguished
respectfully as male or female; the sum of the structural, functional and behavioral
peculiarities of living beings that subserve reproduction by two inneracting <sic> parents
and distinguish male from female. ”).
190
Though noting the early favorable result in Karen Ulane’s suit E. Airlines, Inc., 81 C
4411, 1982 WL 31020 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court uncritically relied
upon Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Md. 1977); and Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Ca1.
1975), aff’d. without op., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978). Sommers, 337 N.W.2d at 474.
191
Id. (citing Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa
1978)).
192
Sommers, No. CL-38-21968 at 1 (emphasis added).
193
And, by this, I mean the birth certificate statute was nowhere to be found in the litigation.
During the course of my doctoral studies I reviewed the documents on file at the Polk County
Courthouse and at the State Historical Society of Iowa, both in Des Moines. This is inclusive
of copies of Audra Sommers’ complaints to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in 1980 up
through the decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1983 (with the high court’s original
opinion, see supra note 20, seeming to be the only missing document). None of the
documents indicate that anyone on either side – plaintiff, defense or the judiciary – even
knew of the existence of the 1976 birth certificate statute. Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber
Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in the Quest for the Federal Employment NonDiscrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Left the
Road]. Though I do have trouble believing that no one actually was aware of it; the absence
should be viewed as stronger evidence that no one viewed it as relevant to the operation of
the word “sex” in Iowa law. That, in turn, should not be viewed as evidence that it indeed
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In 2009, as a preface to its pro-marriage equality Varnum v. Brien
decision, the Iowa high court proudly and validly recounted the state’s record
of civil rights advances that can be found in its history of decision-making,
dating back as far as the first opinion ever issued by the court,194 a runaway
slave case with a positive outcome for that runaway slave.195 Sommers was
not among the civil rights triumphs cited in Varnum. Nor was it the case cited
in the court’s mea culpa footnote acknowledging that it has not always “been
at the forefront in recognizing civil rights in all areas and at all times.”196 In
2019, had the Iowa Legislature completely dispensed with gender identity
protections in the Iowa Civil Rights Act instead of merely preventing future
cases such as Good, then the 1983 Sommers decision would have reasserted
itself as governing civil rights precedent under Iowa law.
If by 1983, instead of recognizing transition, Iowa and 16 other statelevel jurisdictions had opted explicitly to ban reflecting transition on birth
certificates and only one (for hypothetical purposes, let us say Tennessee)
had chosen the recognition route,197 it seems highly likely that the Iowa
Supreme Court would have made some reference to what would have been a
clear negative legislative statement by the state against the underlying
concept of transsexuality to rationalize its decision to shut Audra Sommers
(and all transsexuals) out of Iowa sex discrimination protections.

has no such relevance but, instead, that everyone involved failed not just Audra Sommers
but all trans people.
194
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009) (citing In re Ralph, 1 Morris 1 (Iowa
1839); Clark v. Board of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266 (1868); Coger v. North West. Union Packet Co.,
37 Iowa 145 (1873)).
195
As if to anticipatorily contradict Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1857), the Iowa
court surmised, “Property, in the slave, cannot exist without the existence of slavery; the
prohibition of the latter annihilates the former, and, this being destroyed, he becomes free.”
Ralph, 1 Morris at 13. For more on the case, see John C. Parish, An Early Fugitive Slave
Case West of the Mississippi River, 6 IOWA J. HIST. L. & POL. 94 (1908).
196
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 877 n.4 (citing In re Carragher, 128 N.W. 352, 354 (1910)
(upholding certain sex-based occupational distinctions)). Oddly enough, despite no trans
litigants being involved in Varnum, the court did mention the trans birth certificate statute—
but only as part of its discussion of the immutability of sexual orientation. Id. at 893.
197
This is, of course, the converse of the 1983 status quo. Tennessee was, and still is, the
only state to legislatively travel the explicit anti-recognition path. 1977 TENN. ACTS Ch. 128.
See also 2014 TENN. A.G. OP. No. 14-70 (surmising that the existence of the state’s antitrans birth certificate statute would operate to preclude conforming a person’s sex
designation to post-transition reality on existing police booking sheets, warrants, and court
records in Tennessee).
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Equally likely, the following year, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
would have acted similarly. Judge Harlington Wood would not have blithely
dismissed what would have been Karen Ulane’s inability to obtain a
conformed Illinois birth certificate. In the Ulane v. Eastern Airlines opinion
he actually authored, he refused to ascribe any significance to the conformed
birth certificate itself198 or to even overtly acknowledge that the state in which
his court sits then recognized transition (much less that it was the first state
to enact a statute that would do so.199) Of course, state law would not trump
federal law, but it can certainly play an evidentiary role in determining what
Congress could have intended.200 Moreover, acknowledgment of it might
have yielded an opinion which, as an element of live litigation, would have
been no more favorable to plaintiff Karen Ulane than the Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines opinion we all know, but as a judicial and historical artifact threeand-a-half decades on would not provoke readers otherwise not prone to
hyperbole to place it in the same league of dishonor as Bowers v. Hardwick,201
Plessy v. Ferguson202 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.203
Prof. William Eskridge has made the case for dictionaries serving the
expansive cause as to the question of the meaning of “sex” as utilized by
Congress in 1964 for Title VII. There was no unanimity among contemporary
mainstream dictionaries, and certainly not unanimity in favor of antitransgender (and anti-LGB) interpretations of “sex.” Some did indeed go well

198

Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083.
See Katie D. Fletcher, In re Simmons: A Case for Transsexual Marriage Recognition, 37
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 533, 554–55 (2006).
200
Or not intended. The Supreme Court never had the opportunity to rule on the question,
but there was administrative precedent holding that Congress’s complete failure to discuss
how the federal Defense of Marriage Act would operate with respect to heterosexual
marriages involving trans people should not inherently operate to the disadvantage of trans
people.
[I]t is notable that Congress did not mention the case of M. T. v. J. T.,
which recognized a transsexual marriage. Nor did it mention the various
State statutes that at the time of consideration of the DOMA provided
for the legal recognition of a change of sex designation by postoperative
transsexuals. Rather, Congress’s focus, as indicated by its consistent
reference to homosexuals in the floor discussions and in the House
Report, was fixed on, and limited to, the issue of homosexual marriage.
In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I&N Dec. 746, 749–50 (BIA 2005) (omitting citation and footnote).
201
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
202
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
203
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
199
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beyond the biological binary.204 Yet, well after Ulane, dictionaries were used
as weapons against transsexuals in areas of the law far beyond Title VII.205
In the 2019 Supreme Court Title VII cases, there will be two primary
brands of weaponry: an arsenal of dictionaries and the legislative history of
Title VII. History in a broader sense stands poised to be either victor or
victim, and locked arm-in-arm with whichever position prevails will be trans
people.206 Professor Christopher Leslie has highlighted the degree to which
history was victimized even while those seeking marriage equality prevailed
in Obergefell v. Hodges. “Collectively,” Leslie wrote, “the Obergefell
dissenters have valiantly tried to rewrite America’s legal, constitutional, and
social history, all in an attempt to justify denying civil rights to same-sex
couples.”207 He branded the dissents as “false narratives”208 Are trans people
mere months away from being on the short end of the next batch of false
narratives? If so, will they be majorities rather than dissents?
Though the situation is improving, so much of the scholarship on trans
law is riddled with omissions and inaccuracies.209 However, it is disturbing
204

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338–39 (2017) (pointing to
the dictionaries as part of a discussion of Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)); see also Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Andrew M.
Koppelman as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers, Bostick v. Clayton County, Ga. at 20–
21 (U.S. filed July 3, 2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623 and 18-107).
205
See In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002); In re Nash and Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149
and 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
206
This should not be read as dismissive the potential impact on cis LGBs from Bostock v.
Clayton County and Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda should they result in negative decisions
from Supreme Court. However, in light of (1) the degree to which the very existence in the
law of trans people could be impacted negatively by Harris and (2) the long history of certain
corners of LGB rights advocacy demanding that trans people rely solely expansive readings
of Title VII to the exclusion of being included in federal civil rights bills, it is fair to assert
that trans people have much more skin in this particular game.
207
Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from History: The False Narratives of the Obergefell
Dissenters, 92 IND. L.J. 1007 (2017).
208
Id.
209
Published work in other fields can be even worse. For example, an extensive three-volume
set marketed as satisfying the requirements and goals of California’s Fair, Accurate,
Inclusive, and Respectful (FAIR) Education Act, 2011 CAL. LAWS ch. 81, is, in its state-bystate analysis, severely deficient as to transgender history and law. Its chapter on Colorado
wholly omits that state’s laws related to transition recognition. Mary Jo Wiatrak-Uhlenkott,
Colorado, in CHUCK STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE: PEOPLE, ISSUES, AND DOCUMENTS
OF THE LGBT EXPERIENCE (2014), 855, 899 (“Colorado does not currently have laws
expressly related to gender change on state ID”). Missouri’s does mention that state’s birth
certificate statute but offers no insight as to its vintage. Though it does mention J. L. S. v. D.
K. S., it omits the St. Louis anti-crossdressing ordinance and inaccurately asserts that the
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that in 2015 a law review article could be published asserting that Virginia
was in 2002 the first state to allow trans birth certificate amendments without
a surgery requirement.210 This erased not only the fact that Iowa211 (and
possibly Utah212) had done so a quarter-century earlier but that Virginia’s
statute, surgery-specific though it may be, was enacted during the same era,213
an era when the only detectable success of the increasingly professionalized
gay rights movement was the construction of the myth, still believed in some
circles,214 that trans people are legally and politically untouchable.
Amid the emerging transgender scholarship, a simple question arose
regarding the trans community’s ability to secure surprising “political and
policy victories against the odds.” That question is, “[h]ow are they doing
trans-inclusive hate crime statute was initially gay-only and at thereafter became transinclusive. Vanessa Campagna, Missouri, in STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 1039–
47. The single paragraph on identification law in Iowa’s chapter essentially restates the
wording of the birth certificate statute, but with no indication that it came into being before
the state repealed its sodomy statute. The chapter does chide the state’s hate crime statute for
not being trans-inclusive, but again, without any indication of its vintage. Adam Foley, Iowa,
in STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 964–71. Similarly, the author of the chapter on
Michigan quotes directly from that state’s birth certificate statute but says nothing about it
having been enacted in 1978. Karyl E. Ketchum, Michigan, in STEWART, ED., PROUD
HERITAGE, supra at 1013, 1018. It is also worth noting that the chapter on Nebraska, though
it does mention the state’s birth certificate statute, contains no mention of the murder of
Brandon Teena in its section on the state’s LGBT history. Pat Tetrault, Nebraska, in
STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 1055–68. For the marketing of the book, see
Proud Heritage: People, Issues, and Documents of the LGBT Experience, ABC-CLIO (Dec.
2014), https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=A4094C.
210
Nancie Palmer, et. al., Identity: Societal and Legal Ramifications With Special Focus on
Transsexuals, 39 NOVA L. REV. 117, 147 (2015) (“Virginia was the first state that allowed
birth certificate amendments to a trans person’s proper gender without requiring sexreassignment surgery”).
211
1976 IOWA ACTS ch. 1111, § 1 (denoting “surgery or other treatment”).
212
1975 UTAH LAWS ch. 64, § 1 (utilizing the term “sex change” but not spelling out what
degree of medical involvement would suffice).
213
1979 VA. ACTS ch. 711.
214
The belief carried powerful weight a decade ago during the last serious attempt to enact
federal LGB(T) rights legislation. See generally Left the Road, supra note 193; ISAAC WEST,
TRANSFORMING CITIZENSHIPS: TRANSGENDER ARTICULATIONS OF THE LAW 129–62 (2014).
Some feel that, despite rhetoric of inclusion, the belief has not gone away and will again play
a destructive role should the shifting winds of D.C. politics makes LGB(T) rights legislation
viable again. Matthew S. Bajko, With Time, Ire Over Pelosi’s ENDA Stance Fades, BAY
AREA REP., June 27, 2019 at 26 (quoting trans activist Gwen Smith contrasting House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s opposition to trans-inclusion in the 2007 ENDA bill with her
acceptance of it in the Equality Act bill in 2019 by asserting that the latter was “easy, because
she knows it is going nowhere in the Senate. I think we’d see her true colors if something
was actually on the line”).
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that?”215 The sad truth is that it is not always clear. Part II of this article
certainly would have benefited from evidence of the same level of active
engagement by trans Missourians with their state’s legislative process in 1984
as exists regarding New Jersey’s original trans birth certificate statute,216
enacted later that same year.217 It may have occurred, but at present it has
eluded the historical recovery process.
What sadly is clear is that one of the “odds” that trans people have
had to overcome in achieving progress now is a lack of willingness to
acknowledge progress of the past.218 Sometimes this acknowledgement,
when it does occur, is quite perverse. No one can credibly argue that, if North
Carolina had not, in 2016, already had a transsexual birth certificate, it would
have even considered enacting one in the first instance. But the then-41-yearold provision was a part of North Carolina’s legal fabric. The wave of antitrans animosity in 2016 did lead the state’s General Assembly to not only
nullify a Charlotte civil rights ordinance219 but also to more broadly gut civil
rights laws.220 But the infamous H.B.2 did not contain an exclamation point
215

JAMI K. TAYLOR, DANIEL C. LEWIS, AND DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, THE
REMARKABLE RISE OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 295 (2018).
216
1984 N.J. Pub. L. ch. 191. This surgery-privileging statute was recently superseded by a
more modern, non-surgery-specific one. Babs Siperstein Law, 2018 N.J. Pub. L. ch. 58.
217
Records indicate that the bill was sponsored at the urging of a New Jersey-born trans
woman then living in D. C. She played a major role in arranging for letters of support for the
bill from professionals in the trans community and allies. W. Cary Edwards, et. al., to Gov.
Thomas H. Kean, Executive Office Inter-Communication dated Nov. 5, 1984, Gov. Thomas
H. Kean, Counsel’s Office: Bill Files for the 1984–1985 Legislative Session, S54CO002,
Box 31, File S. 1386, New Jersey State Archives, Trenton, New Jersey.
218
See generally, Reflections, supra note 181, at 124–38. An example from within the world
of activism can be found in how the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), during a time of major
tension between establishment-centric gay organizations (such as HRC) and the trans
community over the viability of inclusion in federal civil rights legislation, misrepresented
the 1979 Los Angeles Civil Rights Ordinance as being non-inclusive even in 2002 when in
fact it had been trans-inclusive from day one. Human Rights Campaign, Los Angeles, City
of, CA, HRC WORKNET, http://www.hrc.org/worknet/asp_search/results.asp?skey=sDetail
&id=302 (printout dated Nov. 13, 2002, in possession of author) (URL no longer active);
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Jurisdictions that Prohibit Employment Discrimination Based
on Gender Identity, Characteristics or Expression, HRC WORKNET, http://www.
hrc.org/worknet/asp_search/results_covered.asp?W=2 (printout dated Nov. 13, 2001, in
possession of author) (URL no longer active).
219
CITY OF CHARLOTTE ORD. 7056 (enacted Feb. 22, 2016).
220
2016 N.C. LAWS ch. 3 (2nd Ex. Sess.), since partially revised, 2017 N.C. LAWS ch. 4. See
also Dominic Holden, North Carolina Enacts Law to Allow LGBT Discrimination,
BUZZFEED (last updated Mar. 24, 2016, 12:20 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/dominicholden/north-carolina-lgbt-discrimintion.
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converting North Carolina’s 1975 pro-transsexual birth certificate statute to
a Tennessee-style anti-transsexual birth certificate statute. The 1975 pro-trans
law was even relied upon by 21st century opponents of trans rights during the
state’s nearly-instantaneous proposal and passage of H.B. 2 as a means to
paint that bill as reasonable.221 The same Republican super-majority and the
same Republican governor who quickly made H.B. 2 part of the law of North
Carolina could have wiped out the state’s recognition of transition. But they
did not.
Professor Eskridge and Professor John Ferejohn identify a “superstatute” as:
[A] law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2)
over time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have
a broad effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four
corners of the statute.222
One could argue that the events of 2016 are evidence that the 1975
transsexual birth certificate statute, at least to some degree, established a new
normative framework for state policy (in that it recognized surgical
transition). In addition, it had become firmly rooted in the public culture in
that even anti-LGBT politicians impliedly professed approval of it, albeit
disingenuously for the purpose of enacting anti-civil rights legislation. Yet it
would be hyperbolic—in fact, bordering on silly—to argue that transsexual
birth certificate statutes are the caliber of “super-statute” of which Eskridge
and Ferejohn wrote.223
They are, however, neither “legislative compromises that are shortterm fixes to bigger problems and cannot easily be defended as the best policy
result that can be achieved” nor even, despite seemingly dealing with but a
single word, statutes that “cover narrow subject areas.”224 For trans people,
if they are not super-statutes per se, then they are specialized super-statutes.
221

See generally, House Floor Debate on H.B. 2, N.C. General Assembly, March 23, 2016,
audio available at https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2015-2016%20
Session/Audio%20Archives/2016/03-23-2016.mp3 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).
222
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
223
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is but one of their examples of “super-statutes.” Id. at 1237.
224
Id. at 1215 (offering the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-24, 97
Stat. 175 (1983); Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 1997 HAW ACTS Ch. 383 as statutes
that are not super).
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That is how they are used in everyday life by everyday trans people. Improper
conservative judicial reliance on dictionaries and even a bit of laziness within
the trans community and among its legal allies in not thinking beyond the
“four corners” of birth certificate statutory language has been a roadblock to
them becoming far more in far more jurisdictions than the few that, thus far,
have opened their eyes to what a state’s transition recognition really means.
CONCLUSION
During the heat of the 2012 presidential campaign, the Washington
Blade ran an opinion piece about the then-current state of trans rights. “Trans
Americans enjoy robust bias protections,” perennial Maryland legislative
candidate225 Dana Beyer declared.226 Far from being just an overly optimistic
analysis of law by a non-attorney, it was a dangerous fit of ill-reasoned
castigation of a majority of the trans community that was, and still is,
unwilling to accept smoke and mirrors in place of statutory bedrock.
“ENDA,” she asserted, was “not a legal necessity today to protect transgender
Americans” but, instead, merely a “political necessity.”227
Criticism of her analysis is not incompatible with advocacy for
expansive use of trans birth certificate statutes. Yes, there was much to be
happy about on the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins front in 2012. The
nightmarish Holloway-Sommers-Ulane triumvirate had been joined on the
trans legal landscape by decisions such as Schwenk v. Hartford,228 Rosa v.

225

Michael K. Lavers, Jealous Wins Md. Gubernatorial Primary, WASH. BLADE, June 29,
2018 at 4, 8; Michael K. Lavers, Mizeur Falls Short in Maryland, WASH. BLADE, June 27,
2014 at 1, 4; Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Dana Beyer to Launch Maryland Delegate Bid, WASH.
BLADE (June 24, 2010, 2:16 PM), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2010/06/24/danabeyer-to-launch-maryland-delegate-bid/.; Will O’Bryan, Political Transition: Democrat
Dana Beyer Fights to be Maryland’s First Transgender Delegate, METRO WEEKLY (Aug. 9,
2006), https://www.metroweekly.com/2006/08/political-transition/.
226
I do understand that authors rarely have full control over the titles of their work once they
are accepted for print. I’ve had a few columns printed in the Washington Blade; none ran
with the exact title I’d submitted. Had Beyer not used the key word “robust,” for which I
have long criticized her column, it would be unfair to attribute that phraseology to her.
However, that language does appear in the body of the column – arguably with even more
of a Pollyanna view of the law than the title suggests: “[L]et’s acknowledge and use our
robust protections, and let’s not promote ignorance because we’re unable to adapt to
circumstances that have radically changed for the better.” Dana Beyer, Trans Americans
Enjoy Robust Bias Protections, WASH. BLADE, June 29, 2012 at 21.
227
Id.
228
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Park West Bank,229 Smith v. City of Salem,230 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati231
and Glenn v. Brumby.232 Joining them that year was Macy v. Holder, the
EEOC decision formally disavowing the anti-trans view of Title VII and
specifically conceding “that intentional discrimination against a transgender
individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination
‘based on…sex,’ and such discrimination violates Title VII.”233
Schwenk, Rosa, Smith, Barnes, Glenn, and Macy all joined the old
triumvirate; nothing truly replaced it, even in circuits that adopted Price
Waterhouse-centric reasoning. With top LGB powerbrokers having long
before decided that marriage equality was the agenda item, any chance
whatsoever of ENDA becoming law had died during the first biennium of the
Obama Administration.234 While it lay dead in Congress, Title VII still only
said “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”235
There was no “sexual orientation.” And there was no “gender identity
or expression.” And then came the Trump Administration.
LGBT America spent much of the summer and early fall of 2018
concerned about the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme
Court, both because of his past236 and because of what a future with him on
the high court might bring.237 Well before Kavanaugh was nominated, the
high court had dodged Gavin Grimm’s case.238 But with Kavanaugh on the
Court as the replacement for Anthony Kennedy, on April 22, 2019, the Court
granted certiorari in Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC on the specific questions
of whether Title VII covers trans people per se and whether it covers trans
people via the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory.239
The case originated in Michigan.240 Much like Missouri of today and
Iowa of 1983, Michigan is a state that has a sex discrimination statute and a
229

214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
231
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
232
663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
233
App. No. 0120120821, Agency No. ATF-2011-00751 at *14 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
234
Future Already Been Forgotten?, supra note 133, at 576–94.
235
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S §2000e.
236
Peter Rosenstein, Will the Senate Confirm a Lying Sleazebag?, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 5,
2018 at 19.
237
Kathi Wolfe, Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid, of Brett Kavanaugh, WASH. BLADE, July 13,
2018 at 18.
238
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
239
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
240
EEOC v. R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F. 3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).
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transsexual birth certificate statute. However, it does not have a specificallyenumerated statutory avenue for trans people to seek redress for bigotry that
impedes their ability to find and maintain employment and housing as well
as to access public accommodations on the same terms as all others. A
Kavanaugh-infused Supreme Court could rule against the tapestry of transinclusive interpretations of federal law that trans people have, largely on an
ad hoc basis, used in recent years. Despite that tapestry being anything but
“robust,” in many instances, trans people have been told by cis gay power
brokers to rely on it to the exclusive consideration of adding trans protections
to LGB-only bills,241 notably the pre-2007 ENDA proposals.242 If that
tapestry disintegrates from merely not robust to wholly non-existent,243 trans
people will need to know as much as we can about what we have to fall back
on. Those who might be handling such cases need to know as well.
And so do those who will be deciding the cases. But the outlook for
accurate decision-making is grim in a world where a federal appellate court
can, in 2019, issue an opinion that can cause an observer to sincerely question
whether it knows the difference between sexual orientation and gender
identity or the history of the terms being defined to mutually exclude one
another.244 No precedent that rests on the demonstrably inaccurate
241
See Cathy Brennan, Grave Disservice, WASH. BLADE, Jan. 5, 2001 at 27; Cathy Brennan,
Banning Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation: A Primer on Maryland’s New Civil
Rights Law, MD. BAR J., May–June 2002, at 50, 53–54 (touting the state’s 2001 gay-only
rights law and leaving Price Waterhouse for trans people as an “emerging legal theor[y],”
taking up where the 2001 Washington Blade item, from prior to the bill’s passage, left off).
242
This is in addition to the overly optimistic assessments of Beyer and those of like mind.
Katrina C. Rose, Three Names in Ohio: In re Bicknell, In re Maloney and Hope for
Recognition that the Gay-Transgender Twain Has Met, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 89, 99 n.46
(2002) (citing a representative of HRC for a 1999 assertion that the combination of (1)
whatever may sprout from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and (2) the non-inclusive version
of ENDA that HRC insisted upon up through the ENDA Crisis of 2007 as combining to leave
no possibility that any trans person would not be covered by federal law).
243
Arianne Cohen, The Trump Administration is Canceling LGBTQ People on Government
Websites, Fast Company (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90434456/thetrump-administration-is-canceling-lgbtq-people-on-government-websites (noting that the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention replaced “LGBTQ” with “LGB” on pages about
queer youth, while also deleting certain transgender statistics).
244
In Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S. D. Tex. 2018), the district
court stated that the Fifth Circuit had not yet addressed the question of whether Title VII
encompassed transgender discrimination. However, Judge Ho of the Fifth Circuit countered
that “we have addressed the issue. In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979),
we expressly held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”
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presumption that enactment of a gay-only rights bill would have had any
positive impact on trans people as trans people should have any force today.
Yet it does.
Even in a trans-friendly Harris ruling, it seems unlikely that the high
court or even those arguing the case will delve into the still-largely-untapped
wealth of state trans law. A trans-averse ruling will leave all trans people in
Michigan in the position of needing an alternative to Title VII, an alternative
that seems unlikely to emerge at the federal level any time soon, even if a
Democrat enters the White House in 2021. They will need to make arguments
based on their own state’s law. Michigan’s legal framework contains the
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)245 and a trans birth certificate
statute, enacted two years apart.246
The concept of interpreting the “sex” ELCRA provision to include
trans people is not unheard of. When Michigan’s civil rights agency decided
to do so (along with interpreting it to include sexual orientation),247 the
decision was not without pushback. Republican Attorney General Bill
Schuette quickly issued an opinion as dictionary reliant as the R.M.A. dissent.
Absent, though, was any mention of the Michigan Legislature having altered
the legal paradigm of “sex” in a trans-positive manner two years after it
passed the ELCRA.248 Schuette’s Democratic successor, Dana Nessel,
adopted the trans-positive view espoused by the civil rights commission,249
but that is not an ultimate solution. It is merely a pause until the inevitable
resolution by Michigan’s appellate courts, which have demonstrated a
willingness to go out of their way to allow a cause of action by cis plaintiffs
against trans equality.250
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1976 MICH. ACTS ch. 453, currently codified in relevant part at MICH. STAT.
§37.2202(1)(a) (2019).
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Discrimination, DETROIT FREE PRESS (last updated May 22, 2018, 9:48 AM),
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46

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

And, riding the pendulum back to the possibility of a positive Harris
ruling from the Supreme Court, some trans people in Michigan will still need
to be aware of, and be able to make, an argument for the ELCRA and the
trans birth certificate statute working in concert to the benefit of trans civil
rights. For that positive Harris ruling will do nothing for those caught in the
Michigan analogue of the gap presented in this Article’s introduction. The
Missouri Human Rights Act applies to employers of at least six people.251
The ELCRA, however, encompasses employers of at least one person.252
The theory that the Missouri Supreme Court breathed life into via
R.M.A.’s footnote seven will not be an academic one irrespective of how the
U.S. Supreme Court rules in Harris. However, a negative outcome will make
its vitality an imperative not merely for trans people in Missouri and
Michigan but also for those in Arizona,253 Kentucky,254 Louisiana,255
Nebraska,256 North Carolina,257 Wisconsin,258 and Virginia.259 The statutory
framework in each of these states contains a trans birth certificate provision
as well as one or more provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sex.260
But each lacks an explicit statutory prohibition against discrimination against
trans people. Even Wisconsin, almost four decades after it became the first to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation—defined, of course, to

251

MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(8) (2019).
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Compare Equal Employment Practices Act, 1977 N.C. LAWS ch. 726; with An Act to Amend
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Surgery, 1975 N.C. LAWS ch. 556.
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Trans Person Reelected to a State Legislature, LGBTQ NATION (Nov. 6, 2019),
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exclude trans people261—leaves those who can use its (or another state’s)
trans birth certificate statute with no avenue of redress against discrimination.
This Article has taken a somewhat convoluted route. But it is one
necessitated by the degree to which the rationale of footnote seven has been
ignored prior to R.M.A.. Beginning in Iowa, this Article did spend most of its
time in Missouri, only to conclude in Michigan, all in service of a legal theory
that should have been self-evident decades ago but which disturbing
percentages of multiple communities, legal professionals, historians and
LGB people, still refuse to recognize as even a possibility, much less a reality.
This Article also undergirds a historico-legal reality that goes much deeper
than footnote seven: that long before any legislatures seriously considered
LGB anti-discrimination measures, several not only considered but approved
of conferring positive legal status upon change of sex.262 That is robust.
Those acts of conferring—when and where they happened—did more
than merely give individual trans people the ability to live life without
identification documents that would out them at every turn. Contrary to what
the calcified, minimalistic definitions in the mainstream dictionaries
selectively relied upon by certain judges say, those legislatures changed
“sex,”263 even if the dictionaries did not acknowledge it. The birth certificate
statutes may not rise to the level of “super statutes” as Eskridge and Ferejohn
envision the term,264 but the thousands upon thousands of trans people who
have used them might argue differently. For it is impossible to use such a
statute by only staying within its four corners.265 Anyone who makes such
four-corner use thereafter goes out into the world. Seeking or attempting to
maintain employment. Seeking or attempting to maintain housing. Making
use of any number of public accommodations.
With the help of amended/new birth certificates (as well as drivers
licenses, passports, etc.), it is all done as who they really are while interacting
261

WIS. STAT. § 111.32(13m) (2019) (“[H]aving a preference for heterosexuality,
homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being identified with
such a preference.”).
262
See generally, Reflections, supra note 181, at 126–31.
263
This is not necessarily a theory put forth by Joanne Meyerowitz in her important work on
the history of transsexuality, but it would be improper not to pay homage to her research.
JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES (2002).
264
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 222, at 1215.
265
Id. at 1216 (“[T]he super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad
effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four comers of the statute.”).
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with at least some individuals who, if given absolute power over transition,
would “mandate it out of existence.”266
The first trans person to use the first trans birth certificate statute,
whoever she or he may have been, took that statute beyond its textual four
corners the instant that that person left the courthouse with a governmentsanctioned change of sex. As the Illinois Supreme Court held in City of
Chicago v. Wilson, that first statute had legal impact well beyond its four
corners even for those who had yet to use it.267 There has never been a
legitimate reason to view the statutory changes that recognize such a core
aspect of life as transition as not having effect throughout the entirety of the
body of law of those states which have enacted them. Yet that has rarely
stopped such erasure from taking place. What stopped the Iowa Supreme
Court in 1983 from recognizing the effect in Sommers, at least beyond
conservative inertia, is unclear, though it is clear that no one on either side
made the argument for it. What is also clear is that, at present, decisions such
as Wilson and R.M.A. —generations removed from one another—are
exceptions. Irrespective of how the U.S. Supreme Court rules in Harris, these
decisions should become the rule. Nevertheless, this Article should not be
read as offering a prediction as to whether they will.

266

RAYMOND, TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 178. Raymond is a largely
discredited, transphobic second-wave feminist. However, trans-erasive thought has begun
to creep into the judiciary. See United States v. Varner, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1346 at *9–
*10 (5th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020) (Duncan, J.) (suggesting strongly that any acknowledgement
whatsoever of trans litigants’ identities should be considered judicial impartiality that
prejudices opposing parties).
267
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therefore, have been equally invalid, as against a pre-surgical transsexual person, the moment
that the law took effect in 1955 as it was held to be regarding the Feb. 1974 arrest that set
the litigation in motion. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978).
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APPENDIX A: RELEVANT VOTING RECORDS OF THOSE WHO SERVED IN BOTH
THE 1969-1970 AND THE 1975-1976 SESSIONS OF THE IOWA LEGISLATURE

Legislator

VOTE ON ADDITION OF “SEX”
TO IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
1969 H.F. 251
House floor vote: Feb. 16, 1970
Senate floor vote: March 25, 1970
Chamber
Yes
No
A/NV

VOTE ON TRANSSEXUAL BIRTH
CERTIFICATE BILL:
1975 H.F. 798
House floor vote: April 28, 1975
Senate floor vote: Jan. 30, 1976
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Yes
No
A/NV
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APPENDIX B: RELEVANT VOTING RECORDS OF THOSE WHO SERVED IN BOTH
THE 1983-1984 AND THE 1985-1986 SESSIONS OF THE MISSOURI GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

Legislator

Mark C. Abel
G.M. Allen
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J.B. (Jet) Banks
Stephen (Steve)
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Francis (Bud) Barnes
Jim Barnes
Robert (Bob) Barney
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Karen McCarthy
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Francis (Fran) R.
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VOTE ON MISSOURI HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT BILL:
1986 S.B. 513
1st Senate floor vote: April 2nd
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Dewey G. Crump
Wayne Crump
Phil B. Curls
George P. Dames
Fletcher Daniels
Mrs. Pat Danner
Steve Danner
Michael P. David
W.T. (Bill) Dawson
John Dennis
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Edwin L. Dirck
David Doctorian
Lorita (Laurie) B.
Donovan
Patrick Dougherty
Sam Doutt
Vic Downing
Joseph L. (Joe)
Driskill
Robert L. Dunning, Sr.
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Alex J. Fazzino
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Bob Holden
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W.O. (Bob) Howard
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Robert (Bob) Jackson
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James W. (Jim)
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W. Eugene Oakley
Judith O’Connor
Matt O’Neill
Joseph R. Ortwerth
D.R. (Ozzie) Osbourn
Lois Osbourn
William R. O’Toole
Edward E. Ottinger
Paul (Pete) Page
Henry A. Panethiere
Carole Roper Park
Lester R. Patterson
Jim Pauley
Walter R. Peterson, Jr.
Jack E. Pohrer
Marvin E. Proffer
Edward E. Quick
William (Bill) Raisch
Don Randall
David L. Rauch
Sandra Lee Reeves
Tony Ribaudo
James N. Riley
Henry C. Rizzo
Randy Robb
Richard (Dick) Roehl
Larry Rohrbach
James (Jay) Russell
John T. Russell
Jeff W.
Schaeperkoetter
Edward H. Schellhorn
Earl L. Schlef
John D. Schneider
Ed Schwaneke
David E. Scott
Delbert Scott
John E. Scott
Vernon E. Scoville
Robert (Bob) Sego
Stephen R. Sharp
Gary D. Sharpe
S. Sue Shear
O.L. Shelton
Bill Skaggs
Dennis Smith
James (Jim) Smith

AFTER R.M.A. V. BLUE SPRINGS
VOTE(S) ON TRANSSEXUAL
BIRTH CERTIFICATE BILL:
1984 S.B. 574
1st Senate floor vote: Feb. 8th
House floor vote: April 3rd
2nd Senate floor vote: April 5th
Chamber
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VOTE ON MISSOURI HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT BILL:
1986 S.B. 513
1st Senate floor vote: April 2nd
House floor vote: April 30th
2nd Senate floor vote: April 30th
Chamber
Yes
No
A/NV
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Legislator

Melvin Smith
Todd P. Smith
Phil Snowden
Danny Staples
Earle F. Staponski
David L. Steelman
Kaye H. Steinmetz
Ron Stivison
James R. (Jim) Strong
Chuck Surface
James Talent
Lynn Thomas
Nelson B. Tinnin
Joan T. Tobin
Merrill M. Townley
Joseph L. Treadway
Irene Treppler
Charles Quincy
Troupe
Ralph Uthault, Jr.
Thomas Albert Villa
Nathan B. Walker
Elbert A. Walton, Jr.
Bob Ward
Winnie P. Weber
Richard M. Webster
William L. Webster
William E. Whitehall
Harry Wiggins
Curtis R. Wilkerson
Eddie Williams 131
Fred Williams 56
Roger B. Wilson
(Boone)
Truman E. Wilson
(Buchanan
Clarence J. Wohlwend
J. Dan Woodall
Harriett Woods
Rex R. Wyrick
Robert Ellis Young
Mark A. Youngdahl
Dennis Ziegenhorn

Vol. 5

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW
VOTE(S) ON TRANSSEXUAL
BIRTH CERTIFICATE BILL:
1984 S.B. 574
1st Senate floor vote: Feb. 8th
House floor vote: April 3rd
2nd Senate floor vote: April 5th
Chamber
Yes
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VOTE ON MISSOURI HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT BILL:
1986 S.B. 513
1st Senate floor vote: April 2nd
House floor vote: April 30th
2nd Senate floor vote: April 30th
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AFTER R.M.A. V. BLUE SPRINGS
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BREAKDOWN OF VOTES
LEGISLATORS WHO
SERVED IN THE HOUSE
DURING BOTH THE 1984
AND 1986 SESSIONS

131 OUT OF A
POSSIBLE 163

Yes on both bills: 97
No on both bills: 0
Absent on both bills: 3
Yes on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 8
Yes on BC bill / Absent on MHRA bill: 7
No on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 16
Absent on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 0

LEGISLATORS WHO
SERVED IN THE SENATE
DURING BOTH THE 1984
AND 1986 SESSIONS

30 OUT OF A
POSSIBLE 34

Yes on both bills: 27
No on both bills: 0
Absent on both bills: 0
Yes on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 2
Yes on BC bill / Absent on MHRA bill: 1
No on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0
Absent on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 0

LEGISLATORS WHO
SERVED IN THE HOUSE IN
1984 AND IN THE
SENATE IN 1986

2

Yes on both bills: 1
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 1

TOTALS

Total number of seats in the Missouri General Assembly: 197
Total number of legislators with chances to vote on both bills: 161 (81.7%)
Total number who voted yes on both bills: 125 (63.4% of total seats)
(77.6% OF POSSIBLE VOTES)

